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PROFESSOR NIMMER MEETS PROFESSOR SCHAUER 
(AND OTHERS): AN ANALYSIS OF “DEFINITIONAL 
BALANCING” AS A METHODOLOGY FOR DETERMINING 
THE “VISIBLE BOUNDARIES OF THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT” 
Norman T. Deutsch* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Despite the fact that it is phrased in absolutist terms (Congress and, 
by incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment, the States “shall make 
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech”1), the First Amendment 
does not “give absolute protection to every individual to speak whenever 
or wherever he pleases or to use any form of address in any 
circumstances that he chooses.”2  Indeed, as Professor Schauer has 
observed, there are large categories of “what would be called ‘speech’ in 
ordinary language” that are not encompassed within the First 
Amendment.3  He notes that the “important” difference between speech 
 
*
  Professor of Law, Albany Law School, Union University.  The author wishes to thank Catherine 
Bonventre, Class of 2005, and Julie Ovicher, Class of 2006, for valuable research and technical 
support. 
 1. U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV. 
 2. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 19 (1971). See also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 
U.S. 568, 571 (1942) (“[T]he right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all 
circumstances.”). 
 3. Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of The First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration 
of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1773, 1771 (2004) [hereinafter Schauer, 
Boundaries].  Professor Schauer refers to criminal law, “securities regulation, antitrust law, and 
labor law;” the law of copyright and trademark, sexual harassment, fraud, evidence, regulation of 
professionals; and a considerable portion of tort law.  Id. at 1783-84.  Further, 
[i]f we do not restrict our inquiry to propositional speech—that is, if we include the 
speech by which we make wills, enter into contracts, render verdicts, create conspiracies, 
consecrate marriages, admit to our crimes, post warnings, and do much else—it becomes 
still clearer that the speech with which the First Amendment is even slightly concerned is 
but a small subset of the speech that pervades every part of our lives. 
Id. at 1784.  See also Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three 
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that is included and speech that is excluded is “the . . . distinction 
between coverage and protection.”4  Speech that is included within the 
First Amendment may still be subject to regulation, but the regulation 
must meet First Amendment standards.  However, regulation of speech 
that is excluded is not subject to First Amendment analysis.5 
Professor Schauer also argues that “existing normative theories 
seem of little relevance to achieving a descriptive understanding of how 
the First Amendment came to look the way it does and how it came to 
include what it includes and exclude what it excludes.”6  He suggests 
“that the most logical explanation of the actual boundaries of the First 
Amendment might come less from an underlying theory of the First 
Amendment and more from the political, sociological, cultural, 
historical, psychological, and economic milieu in which the First 
Amendment exists and out of which it developed.”7  Nonetheless, once 
the issue has reached the level of litigation, a practical methodology is 
needed to determine what is a First Amendment speech case and what is 
not, or to use Professor Schauer’s words, to determine “[t]he [v]isual 
[b]oundaries of the First Amendment[].”8 
Professor Nimmer used the phrase “definitional balancing” to 
describe what he thought was the appropriate methodology for the 
United States Supreme Court to use in “defining which forms of speech 
are to be regarded as ‘speech’ within the meaning of the First 
Amendment.”9  However, the Court has never explicitly said that it 
 
Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265 (1981) [hereinafter Schauer, Categories]. 
 4. Schauer, Categories, supra note 3, at 275-76. 
 5. See Schauer, Boundaries, supra note 3, at 1769-73.  However, this is true only to the 
extent that such speech is proscribed, or otherwise regulated, based on the underlying reasons why 
such speech is excluded from the First Amendment.  See infra notes 142-52 and accompanying text. 
 6. Schauer, Boundaries, supra note 3, at 1787. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 1774.  Professor Schauer’s reference is to the fact that although many of the 
boundaries of the First Amendment are “[invisible] because they have been taken for granted[,] . . . 
the boundaries of the First Amendment have been highly visible” with respect to those categories of 
speech that have often been the subject of litigation  See id. at 1774-77. 
 9. Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied 
to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REV. 935, 942 & n. 24 (1968) (citing “various” 
authorities as precursors “of the doctrine of definitional balancing”).  Definitional balancing is 
sometimes referred to as “categorical balancing.”  See Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 
57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1138 n.175 (2005); John Rothchild, Menacing Speech and the First 
Amendment: A Functional Approach to Incitement That Threatens, 8 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 207, 209 
(1999); Jeffrey M. Shaman, Constitutional Interpretation: Illusion and Reality, 41 WAYNE ST. L. 
REV. 135, 162-63 (1994) [hereinafter Shaman, Constitutional Interpretation]; Alan Brownstein, 
How Rights Are Infringed: The Role of Undue Burden Standard Analysis in Constitutional 
Doctrine, 45 HASTINGS L. REV. 867, 956 n.355 (1994); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral 
Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 47 & n.3 (1987).  In addition the term “categorization” has been 
2
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applies such a methodology.  Nonetheless, Professor Nimmer found its 
application implicit in the Court’s decisions.10 
Used as a methodology for defining the scope of speech that the 
First Amendment includes and excludes, definitional balancing involves 
striking a balance between competing speech and governmental 
regulatory interests,11 based on First Amendment values,12 and the 
creation of rules that can be applied in subsequent cases.13  Professor 
Nimmer viewed definitional balancing as a middle ground between 
absolutism (in the sense that “literally all speech is protected”)14 and ad 
hoc balancing (a case by case weighing of the competing interests “for 
the purpose of determining which litigant deserves to prevail in a given 
case”).15 Commentators, however, are divided over its nature, 
desirability, and application. 
Some commentators view definitional balancing as a form of 
absolutist approach to the First Amendment,16 while others take the 
 
used to describe what amounts to definitional balancing.  See Keith Werhan, The Liberalization of 
Freedom of Speech on a Conservative Court, 80 IOWA L. REV. 51, 53-59 (1994) (using both the 
terms “categorization” and “categorical balancing”); John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Study in 
the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 
1500 & n.74 (1975).  However, the term “categorization” has also been used to describe the creation 
of “a priori” categories in contrast to “[d]efinitional or categorical balancing [which] makes use of 
categories, though not a priori one.” Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Theory of Low Value Speech, 48 SMU 
L. Rev. 297, 343 (1995) [hereinafter Shaman, Low Value Speech].  To add to the confusion, 
Professor Redish, in contradiction to Professor Shaman, has described “categorical balancing” as 
the balancing of “competing interests in an a priori manner.” Martin H. Redish, Unlawful Advocacy 
and Free Speech Theory: Rethinking the Lessons of the McCarthy Era, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 9, 17 
(2004). 
 10. Nimmer, supra note 9, at 943, 949. 
 11. The terms “government interests” and “societal interests” are often used interchangeably 
in the First Amendment context.  See Steven J. Heyman, Righting the Balance: An Inquiry Into the 
Foundations and Limits of Expression, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1275, 1307 (1998); T. Alexander 
Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 981 n.231 (1987) (when 
he wrote this article, Dean Aleinikoff was a Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law 
School; he has been Dean at Georgetown University Law Center since 2004). 
 12. Nimmer, supra note 9, at 948-50.  See infra Part III.A.  See also DONALD ALEXANDER 
DOWNS, NAZIS IN SKOKIE 7 (1985) (“Definitional Balancing . . . entails establishing the basic types 
of speech which are consistent with the First Amendment’s purposes, and then protecting these 
forms of speech as fully and consistently as is possible.”). 
 13. Nimmer, supra note 9, at 944-45. 
 14. Id. at 941. 
 15. Id. at 942.  See generally id. at 935-42. 
 16. See WILLIAM COHEN ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1291 (12th ed. 2005) (“For a 
‘definitional balancer,’ the proper rule in a particular context may be one of absolute protection for 
speech. . . .”); Heyman, supra  note 11, at 1307-09, 1309 n. 180 (referring to definitional balancing 
as a form of absolutism); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 792 
(2d ed.1988) (same); Ely, supra note 9, 1482, 1500 n.74 (same); Schauer, Categories, supra note 3, 
at 274 (same).  Cf. Pierre J. Schlag, An Attack on Categorical Approaches to Freedom of Speech, 30 
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opposite view and think that there is little difference between 
definitional balancing and ad hoc balancing.17  Commentators are also 
divided on whether definitional balancing is a flexible methodology or 
whether it is too inflexible.18  Additionally, they disagree on the 
propriety of the underlying methodology to the extent that it is perceived 
as involving a comparative weighing of competing interests.19  The 
methodology itself is often described as a technique that limits the scope 
 
UCLA L. REV. 671, 673, 674 n.9 (1983) (“Definitional balancing is theoretically distinguishable 
from non-absolutists categorical approaches” but “[t]he distinction . . . may be more methodological 
than substantive. . . .”); STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND 
ROMANCE 12 (1990) (“[T]he absolute preference for rules – definitional balancing – is overly 
absolute.”). 
 17. Isaac Molnar, Resurrecting the Bad Tendency Test to Combat Instructional Speech: 
Militias Beware, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1333, 1369 n.243 (1998) (asserting that “definitional balancing 
will essentially break down into ad hoc balancing as soon as the Court is willing to consider other 
interests of different degree from their previous decisions”); SHIFFRIN, supra note 16, at 16-17 
(arguing that the difference between definitional balancing and ad hoc balancing “is not sharp”); 
Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 980 (asserting that the distinction between ad hoc balancing and 
definitional balancing is “artificial”); Thomas I. Emerson, First Amendment and the Burger Court, 
68 CAL. L. REV. 422, 439 (1980) (maintaining that “[w]hile the traditional criticisms of balancing 
apply more directly to ad hoc [balancing] than definitional balancing, the distinction between the 
two is of doubtful significance in formulating First Amendment doctrine”). 
 18. Compare Schlag, supra note 16, at 674 n.9 (flexible) (“Definitional balancing does not 
provide . . . a finished product: it remains subject to change if the state interest asserted prove to be 
novel and substantially less compelling or substantially more compelling than those state interest 
asserted in past balancing acts.”) with SHIFFRIN, supra note 16, at 15 (inflexible) (“The particular 
weakness of Nimmer’s methodology is its inflexibility.”); Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 979 
(inflexible) (discussing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982)). 
 19. Commentators questioning the desirability of balancing as a methodology include 
Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 944 (“serious problems in the mechanics of balancing” exist); 
Emerson, supra note 17, at 439 (arguing that “legal doctrines should be designed to formulate 
categories based solely upon the characteristics of the conduct and value structure underlying the 
first amendment” ); David L. Faigman, Reconciling Individual Rights and Government Interests: 
Madisonian Principles Versus Supreme Court Practice, 78 VA. L. REV. 1521, 1524 (1992) 
(asserting that considering the government’s interest in defining the scope of the constitutional right 
is “contrary to the fundamental operating assumptions of the Constitution”); Heyman, supra note 
11, at 1279-80 (recommending that “First Amendment issues [should be] . . . conceived of . . . as 
conflicts of rights . . . [not] as clashes between free speech and ‘social interest’”); Frederick 
Schauer, Commentary: The Aim and the Target in Free Speech Methodology, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 
562, 562 n.4 (1989) (favoring an approach that seeks to determine of the scope of the First 
Amendment by “asking whether this is an act, or an example of a type of act, that triggers the 
concerns of the first amendment . . . independently of an evaluation of the desirability of regulating 
that act”). 
  Other commentators think that balancing is an appropriate mode of First Amendment 
analysis.  See, e.g., Shaman, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 9, at 175 (“[B]alancing is the 
only sound way to interpret the Constitution.”); Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment And 
Economic Regulation: Away From a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 
1212, 1251-52 (1983) (the Court “has been right in . . . balanc[ing] the impact of challenged 
regulations on first amendment values against the seriousness of the evil that the state seeks to 
mitigate”). 
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of First Amendment protection,20 and some commentators think that it 
limits, or at least has the potential to limit, too much speech.21  On the 
other hand, others view definitional balancing as being speech 
protective,22 and some, at least implicitly, believe that it protects too 
 
 20. See Note, Content Regulation and The Dimensions of Free Expression, 96 HARV. L. REV. 
1854, 1858 n.28 (1983) (“‘[D]efinitional balancing’ . . . exclude[s] from protection categories of 
expression whose social harm outweighs their value.”); William D. Deane, COPA and Community 
Standards on the Internet: Should the People of Maine and Mississippi Dictate the Obscenity 
Standards in Las Vegas and New York, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 245, 249 n.24 (2001) (“The 
definitional approach simply categorizes certain speech as unprotected by the First Amendment 
because, as a rule the government’s interest outweighs the value of those particular classes of 
speech.”); Steven J. Heyman, Spheres of Autonomy: Reforming the Content Neutrality Doctrine in 
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 647, 671 (2002) (“Under that 
approach, a class of speech should not be protected if its social value is outweighed by the social 
harm that it causes.”); Yvonne C. Ocrant, Constitutional Challenge to Encryption Export 
Regulations: Software Is Speechless, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 503, 522-23 (1998) (“[W]hen applying 
definitional balancing, the Court will uphold a regulation of speech if the Court is convinced that the 
class of speech in question is sufficiently harmful, even without a showing of actual harm.”); Martin 
H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 624 & n.115 (1982) (definitional 
balancing “allows fully protected speech to be superseded by overriding social interest”); Rothchild, 
supra note 9, at 209 (“Definitional, or categorical balancing, involves designating a particular 
category of speech[;] . . . [t]his . . . approach usually results in reduced protection for speech.”); 
Shaman, Low Value Speech, supra note 9, at 331 (“Definitional balancing is the primary method the 
Court uses for giving less constitutional protection to speech, such as libel, that the Court feels has 
less than full constitutional value.”); Werhan, supra note 9, at 56 (“As the Burger Court settled onto 
place, that speech-protective spirit dissipated and the Justices embraced categorization as a method 
to restrict First Amendment protection.”). 
 21. Faigman, supra note 19, at 1523 (“Because the threshold question regarding the existence 
of constitutional rights has become infected with the government’s countervailing interests, those 
individual rights have lost much of their vitality, if not their very existence.”); Schauer, Categories, 
supra note 3, at 276 (“One danger of definitional-absolutist theories . . . is that [they may have the 
effect of] “constrict[ing freedom of speech].”); Note supra note 20, 1858 n.28 (“‘[D]efinitional 
balancing’ which would exclude from protection categories of expression whose social harm 
outweighs their value is inadequate because it requires weighing interests of different sorts and 
violates autonomy of expression by restricting speech on the basis of its consequences.”). 
 22. See Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 987 (“[B]alancing has proven to be a robust 
methodology for the creation and extension of rights.”); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny In 
Constitutional Analysis, 85 CAL. L. REV. 297, 353 n.242 (1997) (definitional balancing lines are 
drawn “narrowly” so as to afford “some constitutional protection” to “even seemingly ‘unprotected 
speech’”); Ronald A. Cass,  Mellville B. Nimmer Symposium: Article: The Perils of Positive 
Thinking: Constitutional Interpretation and Negative First Amendment Theory, 34 UCLA L. REV. 
1405, 1475 n.206 (1987) (“The focus of definitional balancing . . . traditionally has been the 
mechanics of protecting speech. . . .”); Ely, supra note 9, at 1500 (“Categorization . . . [is] “more 
likely to protect expression in crisis times.”); Rosemary C. Salomone, Public Forum Doctrine and 
the Perils of Categorical Thinking: Lessons From Lamb’s Chapel, 24 N.M. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1994) 
(definitional balancing is a “categorical or formulaic approach . . . [that is] considered to be 
generally speech protective”); RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF 
SPEECH, § 2:12, at 2-7 & n.1 (3d ed. 2004) (describing definitional balancing as being more speech 
protective than ad hoc balancing); TRIBE, supra note 16, § 12-2, at 793-94 (same). 
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much speech.23  Sometimes commentators cannot even agree on whether 
definitional balancing was actually applied in a given case.24  Others do 
not object to the methodology as such, but are critical of where the Court 
has drawn the definitional line in a particular context.25 Finally, at least 
one commentator thinks that the term “definitional balancing” is 
potentially confusing;26 he uses the term “‘heightened scrutiny’” to 
describe the process.27 
This article examines definitional balancing as a methodology for 
determining the “visible boundaries of the First Amendment.” More 
specifically, it focuses on the Court’s use of definitional balancing, as a 
technique for drawing definitional lines within categories of speech, to 
distinguish between speech that is included within the First Amendment, 
and speech that is excluded so that it may be proscribed based on its 
 
 23. See, e.g., Heyman, supra note 11, at 1279 (“[F]ree speech is a right that is limited by the 
fundamental rights of other individuals and the community as a whole.”); Note, supra note 20, at 
1862 (implying that the First Amendment only protects speech that is necessary “to promote the 
realization of ‘man’s spiritual nature’”).  See also infra note 361 and accompanying text. 
 24. Compare Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 1001 (stating that the Court did not balance in N.Y. 
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)) with Adam M. Samaha, Litigant Sensitivity In First 
Amendment Law, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1291, 1349-50 (2004) (stating that the Court applied 
definitional balancing in Sullivan) and Lee Levine, Judge and Jury in the Law of Defamation: 
Putting the Horse Behind the Cart, 35 AM. U. L. REV 3, 8-11, 64 (1985) (same) and Nimmer, supra 
note 9, at 942, 949 (stating that the Court implicitly applied definitional balancing in Sullivan). 
 25. See Lori Weiss, Is the True Threats Doctrine Threatening the First Amendment? Planned 
Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists Signals the 
Need to Remedy an Inadequate Doctrine, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1283, 1286 (2004) (there is “a need 
to revise true threats jurisprudence to cure its deficiencies”); O. Lee Reed, The State is Strong But I 
am Weak: Why the ‘Imminent Lawless Action’ Standard Should Not Apply to Targeted Speech that 
Threatens Individuals with Violence, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 177, 207 (2000) (the imminent lawless action 
standard “is ill-suited as a general category defining harm both in the context of indictment or threat 
against the state and in the context of incitement, threat, intimidation, or harassment against 
individuals”); Rothchild, supra note 9, at 223-24 (the definitional line should be drawn so as to 
exclude “menacing” speech from the First Amendment); Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case 
for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L.J. 383, 492 n.250 (1999) (in the context of a right of 
publicity, “[a]ttempts to predefine categories of use become so convoluted as to sacrifice the clarity 
that is the greatest benefit of a definitional approach”); Alon Harel, Bigotry, Pornography, and the 
First Amendment, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1887 (1992) (“Racist and pornographic speech . . . should be 
seen as falling into a comprehensive category of unprotected speech.”); Levine, supra note 24, at 14 
(the definitional line the Court drew in defamation cases involving public figures “serves neither the 
first amendment guarantee of robust public debate nor the states’ interest in safeguarding individual 
reputation”).  Even Professor Nimmer thought the Court drew the definitional line in the wrong 
place in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), and in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).  
See Nimmer, supra note 9, at 948 n.39, 956-67. 
 26. SMOLLA, supra note 22, § 2:12, at 2-7 & n.1. 
 27. Id. at 2-7.  In addition, Professor Schauer refers to “heightened standards” in referring to a 
case in which the Court appeared to have applied definitional balancing. Schauer, Boundaries, 
supra note 3, at 1776 (“[L]ibelous utterances are now tested against standards heightened by First 
Amendment coverage.”). 
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content.28 Part II describes definitional balancing in Professor Nimmer’s 
terms. Part III discusses the Court’s application of definitional balancing 
and the issues raised by commentators. 
II.  PROFESSOR NIMMER’S ANALYSIS OF DEFINITIONAL BALANCING 
Professor Nimmer viewed “definitional balancing”29 as an 
alternative to both absolutism and ad hoc balancing.  He rejected 
absolutism, in the sense “that the First Amendment must be interpreted 
and applied with absolute literalness,” as being clearly untrue30 because 
the laws regulating such things as copyrights, espionage, monopolies, 
and perjury are largely unaffected by the First Amendment even though 
they may involve speech.31 Since the First Amendment does not 
encompass all speech, some technique must be used to determine what is 
included and what is excluded.  Professor Nimmer asserted that “[i]f 
such selection is to turn on rational rather than arbitrary considerations, 
it is obvious the selection process requires a balancing of competing 
interests.”32  However, he thought that in making this determination, it 
was “essential” that courts use definitional balancing rather than ad hoc 
balancing “if freedom of speech is to be meaningful as constitutional 
doctrine.”33 
As Professor Nimmer saw it, the differences between the two types 
of balancing include the process that is used, the fact that definitional 
balancing results in rules that can be applied in later cases, and that 
definitional balancing is likely to be more speech protective than ad hoc 
balancing.34 He illustrated these differences in the context of New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan.35  In that case, the Montgomery Alabama police 
 
 28. The application of definitional balancing in other contexts is beyond the scope of this 
article.  See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber and John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum 
Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219, 1219, 1226-
30, 1235-37, 1242 (1984) (arguing that while definitional balancing may be “appropriate” for 
defining categories of speech that are excluded from the First Amendment, it is inappropriate for 
regulating speech with respect to “certain locations, media, or speakers”).  Professor Shiffrin has 
also argued that definitional balancing is not the appropriate methodology for resolving all First 
Amendment issues.  See SHIFFRIN, supra note 16, at 12, 15; Shiffrin, supra note 19, at 1253. See 
also infra notes 389-98 and accompanying text. 
 29. See Nimmer, supra note 9, at 942, 944 (using the language “balancing process on the 
definitional.”). 
 30. Id. at 935. 
 31. Id. at 937. 
 32. Id. at 941-42. 
 33. Id. at 967. 
 34. See generally id. at 939-45. 
 35. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 255 (1964). 
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commissioner brought a libel action against the New York Times for 
publishing a paid civil rights advertisement that allegedly contained 
defamatory statements.36 The plaintiff obtained a jury verdict based on 
common law defamation.37  The Court reversed, holding that the First 
Amendment requires a “rule that prohibits a public official from 
recovering for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct 
unless he proves that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that 
is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether 
it was false or not.”38 
According to Professor Nimmer, the Court in Sullivan “implicitly” 
engaged in balancing “but it was not ad hoc balancing.”39  In ad hoc 
balancing, the Court weighs the competing interests “presented in the 
particular circumstances of the case before the court40 . . . for the 
purpose of determining which litigant deserves to prevail in the 
particular case.”41  Thus, “[i]f the Court had followed the ad hoc 
approach, it would have inquired whether ‘under the particular 
circumstances presented’ the interest of the defendants in publishing 
their particular advertisement outweighed . . . the seriousness of the 
particular resulting injury to the plaintiff’s reputation.”42  However, this 
is not what the Court did; instead, it engaged in definitional balancing. 
In definitional balancing, in contrast to ad hoc balancing, “the Court 
employs balancing not for the purpose of determining which litigant 
deserves to prevail in the particular case, but only for the purpose of 
defining which forms of speech are to be regarded as ‘speech’ within the 
meaning of the first amendment.”43  This inquiry takes place at a higher 
level of generalization. The question is whether “generally . . . the 
speech values”44 at stake outweigh the government’s interest in 
regulating the type of speech at issue.45  Thus, the question in Sullivan 
was not whether “the interest of the [particular] defendants in publishing 
 
 36. Id. at 256. 
 37. Id.  Under the state’s defamation law, the defendant is strictly liable for defamatory 
statements and general damages are presumed even in the absence of proof of loss.  See id. at 267.  
Punitive damages may also be awarded. See id.  If “‘libel per se’ has been established the defendant 
has no defense as to stated facts unless he can persuade the jury that they were true in all their 
particulars.”  Id. 
 38. Id. at 279-80. 
 39. Nimmer, supra note 9, at 943. 
 40. Id. at 944. 
 41. Id. at 942. 
 42. Id. at 943-44. 
 43. Id. at 942. 
 44. Id. at 945, 950. 
 45. See id. at 950-51. 
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their particular advertisement outweighed the interest of the [particular] 
plaintiff in the protection of his reputation.”46  Instead, the question was 
“whether the speech values justify the Court in sweeping away most of 
the law of defamation where the statement is made against a public 
figure.”47 
As Professor Nimmer saw it, the “profound difference between ad 
hoc and definitional balancing lies in the fact that a rule emerges from 
definitional balancing which can be employed in future cases without the 
occasion for further weighing of interests.”48  Thus, in Sullivan, the 
Court created a rule that false statements, which injure the reputation of 
public officials, are constitutionally privileged unless they are made with 
actual malice; “that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
disregard of whether it was false or not.”49 
However, “ad hoc balancing by hypothesis means that there is no 
rule to be applied, but only interests to be weighed.”50  Thus, “[i]n 
advance of a final adjudication by the highest court a given speaker has 
no standard by which he can measure whether his interest in speaking 
will be held of greater or lesser weight than the competing interests 
which opposes his speech.”51  Professor Nimmer argued that while there 
can never “be complete certainty as how a given rule will be applied in a 
new situation, if there is no rule at all then there is no certainty at all.”52  
As he viewed it, “[t]he absence of certainty in the law is always 
unfortunate, but is particularly pernicious where speech is concerned 
because it tends to deter all but the courageous (not necessarily the most 
rational) from entering the market place of ideas.”53  However, the 
creation of a rule through definitional balancing “offers some measure of 
certainty [to First Amendment law] and minimizes speech deterrence.”54  
It creates “a standard by which” a speaker “can measure” whether his 
speech is constitutionally protected.55 
In addition, Professor Nimmer argued that definitional balancing is 
 
 46. Id. at 943. 
 47. Id. at 950. See also id. at 943-44, 949-51.  The Court focused on the fact that the speech at 
issue was a matter of public concern.  See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270-83.  Professor Nimmer argued 
that the speech values of “self expression” and “freedom of speech . . . [as] a necessary safety 
valve” were at also at stake in Sullivan.  Nimmer, supra note 9, at 949. 
 48. Nimmer, supra note 9, at 944-45. 
 49. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.  See Nimmer, supra note 9, at 943. 
 50. Nimmer, supra note 9, at 939. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 945. 
 55. See id. at 939. 
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likely to result in greater protection for speech than ad hoc balancing. 
With respect to legislative encroachments, he noted that since 
definitional balancing creates a rule that defines the scope of the First 
Amendment, “such a rule should continue to be applicable 
notwithstanding subsequent enactment of new legislation which in some 
different manner attempts to protect an interest inimical to speech.”56 
With respect to the judiciary, Professor Nimmer argued that ad hoc 
balancing may skew the result in favor of the interest in regulating 
speech.  This is true for two reasons.  First, “[g]iven the assumption in 
our national heritage that most speech is to be tolerated, it is only those 
who espouse the most unpopular ideas, those against whom feelings run 
the highest that are likely to be the subject of repressive laws, and only 
they are likely to be prosecuted.”57  In his view, “[i]t is too much to 
expect that our judges will be entirely untouched, consciously or 
otherwise, by strong popular feelings—feelings that have more than 
once reached the point of national hysteria—when they come to engage 
in the ‘delicate and difficult task’ of weighing the competing interests.”58  
Consequently, “at the very time when the right of freedom of speech 
becomes crucial, the scales may become unbalanced . . . [in favor of] the 
interest which opposes the speech.”59  Secondly, ad hoc balancing may 
skew the result in favor of the interest in regulating speech because often 
a “court must balance the interest in speech against the compelling force 
of a particular legislative judgment as molded in law which has been 
violated.”60  In such cases, “the court is likely to be swayed by their 
judgment in the weighing of interests.”61 
However, Professor Nimmer maintained that the creation of   
definitional balancing “rule[s] makes it more likely that the balance 
originally struck will continue to be observed despite new and perhaps 
otherwise irresistible pressures.”62  He “concede[d] that neither 
definitional balancing nor any other technique can offer absolute 
assurance that a given court under sufficient internal or external pressure 
in some ‘hard’ case will not depart from a definitional rule.”63  However, 
he argued that “definitional balancing can insulate a judge from legally 
irrelevant pressures to a considerable degree if the judge wishes such 
 
 56. Id. at 945. 
 57. Id. at 940. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 945. 
 63. Id. 
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insulation.”64 
Professor Nimmer also conceded “that, in vacua, ad hoc balancing 
is more likely to consider fine nuances and therefore produce a more just 
result.”65  However, he argued that “this likelihood may be offset by the 
fact that in ad hoc balancing weight is likely to be given only to the 
particular speech involved and not to ‘speech’ generally, so that the 
speech side of the balance may be underweighed when compared with 
the immediate impact of a particular injury.”66  Furthermore, since 
speech cases do not arise in a vacuum, the “likelihood [that ad hoc 
balancing would reach a more equitable result] would be present only in 
an ideal world where ad hoc balancing would not be subject to distortion 
from public and legislative pressures.”67  Thus, in his view “[t]he 
argument that ad hoc balancing is preferable to definitional balancing 
because the former permits a more sensitive appreciation of the equities 
in each particular case may be more easily made in non-speech cases 
where public passions do not generally ride as high.”68 
III.  THE APPLICATION OF DEFINITIONAL BALANCING AND THE VIEWS 
OF COMMENTATORS 
As Professor Schauer has noted, “[most] examples [of] conduct that 
would or might be speech in ordinary language but that is not speech in 
the eyes of the Constitution . . . are rarely if ever litigated.”69  However, 
in those areas that have been subject to litigation, the Court, without 
explicit acknowledgment, has applied definitional balancing as a 
technique for drawing definitional lines within categories of speech to 
distinguish between speech that is included within the First Amendment 
and speech that is excluded, so that it may be proscribed based on its 
content. For the most part, the Court has done so in the way that 
Professor Nimmer described it; the Court has sought to define the outer 
limits of the First Amendment by striking a balance between the 
competing interests based on First Amendment values.70  However, as 
 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 947. 
 69. Schauer, Categories, supra note 3, at 269 (referring to antitrust laws); see also Schauer, 
Boundaries, supra note 3, 1771, 1774 (mentioning criminal law, securities regulation, antitrust law, 
and  labor law; the law of copyright and trademark, sexual harassment, fraud, evidence, regulation 
of professionals, and a considerable portion of tort law). 
 70. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text; see infra notes 99-343 and accompanying 
text. 
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mentioned above, commentators are divided over its nature, desirability, 
and application. 
A.  To What Extent Does Definitional Balancing Involve Balancing? 
As Professor Nimmer explained, definitional balancing is different 
than ad hoc balancing.  In ad hoc balancing, the Court asks whether, in 
the context of the specific facts of the case, the government’s regulatory 
interest outweighs the particular plaintiff’s speech interest for the 
purpose of deciding which party should win.71  Whereas in definitional 
balancing the Court seeks to determine the extent to which the particular 
category of speech at issue is encompassed within the First Amendment 
for the purpose of creating rules that can be applied in later cases.72 
However, definitional balancing is often described as a methodology that 
excludes speech from the First Amendment “if its social value is 
outweighed by the social harm that it causes.”73  This conception equates 
definitional balancing with ad hoc balancing in the sense of “the 
identification, valuation, and comparison of competing interests,”74 
albeit at a higher level of generalization than the latter.75  Under this 
 
 71. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text. 
 72. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text. 
 73. See Heyman, supra note 20, at 671 (2002) (“Under that approach, a class of speech should 
not be protected if its social value is outweighed by the social harm that it causes.”); see also other 
sources cited supra note 20.  Cf. Edward J. Eberle, Practical Reason: The Commercial Speech 
Paradigm, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 411, 435-36 (1992) (“Communitarian interest may represent 
important social values . . . and may occasionally outweigh free speech values in certain limited 
circumstances.”). 
 74. Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 945. 
 75. See Bhagwat, supra note 22, at 353 n.242 (“Definitional balancing requires the Court to 
balance free speech interests against the strength of government objectives with regard to an entire 
category of speech, rather than with regard to specific burden on speech, as is the case with ad hoc 
balancing.”); Daniel O. Conkle, Free Speech and the Indiana Constitution: First Thoughts on Price 
v. State: The Indiana Supreme Court’s Emerging Free Speech Doctrine, 69 IND. L.J. 857, 858 
(1994) (“[T]he judicial definition of unprotected categories is almost inevitably based upon a more 
abstract balancing process, one that evaluates an entire type or category of speech and weighs the 
value of this speech against the governmental interest that might support its regulation.”); Peter 
Krug, Symposium: The Life and Jurisprudence of Justice Thurgood Marshall: Justice Marshall and 
New Media Law: Rules Over Standards?, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 13, 19 (1994) (“[A]t the definition 
stage . . .  categori[es] [are] defined by the type of facts presented, the constitutional right at issue, 
or the nature of the right or interest advanced by the government.”); Reed, supra note 25, at 185 
(stating that in “definitional balancing . . . the Court balances speech values against competing 
interests only in an initial case that defines a category of speech which is constitutionally 
unprotected”);  Salomone, supra note 22, at 14-15 (stating that in “definitional balancing . . . the 
Court balances the weight of the right against the state interest at the macro level and applies the 
result to all future cases”); Shaman, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 9, at 161-62 (stating 
that the balancing of the “pertinent” interests “focuses on the general category rather than on the 
particular instance involved in the case”) ; Douglas Wells, Thurgood Marshall and “Individual Self-
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view, the Court identifies the First Amendment values and the 
government regulatory interest at stake “and reaches a decision or 
constructs a rule of constitutional law by explicitly or implicitly 
assigning values to the identified interest.”76 In such balancing, “[t]he 
focus is directly on the interests or factors themselves[;] [e]ach interest 
seeks recognition on its own and forces a head–to–head comparison with 
the competing interests.”77 
Dean Aleinikoff is the principal critic of balancing as a process of 
valuation and comparison.  He maintains that in this regard there is little 
difference between ad hoc and definitional balancing,78 and they are both 
subject to the same criticisms.79  These include both “an internal 
critique”80 and “an external critique.”81 
His internal critique relates to “how interests are identified, valued 
and compared.”82 He asserts that “the Court has no objective criteria for 
valuing or comparing the interests at stake.”83 Furthermore, in theory, 
“[t]he task [in balancing] is seen as requiring the consideration of all 
relevant interests, whether traceable to the Constitution or to society at 
 
Realization” in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 61 TENN. L. REV. 237, 243 (1993) (“Definitional 
balancing . . . requires the judge to weigh the values underlying the particular category of speech 
against the asserted government interest.”). 
 76. Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 945. 
 77. Id.  For commentators who conceive of definitional balancing as a comparison and 
evaluation of competing interests, see sources cited supra notes 20, 75.  See also Jeffrey Blum, The 
Divisible First Amendment: A Critical Functionalist Approach to Freedom of Speech and 
Campaign Spending, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273, 1301-02 (1983) (stating that the Court, in applying 
“definitional balancing[,] . . . contrasts the societal benefit of protecting a given type of activity with 
the costs entailed in the abandonment of regulatory interests sacrificed by according protection”); 
Faigman, supra note 19, at 1536 (“[In] definitional balancing . . . the Court assesses the weight of 
the right implicated by a particular government action against the gravity of the government’s 
interest in acting.”); see also Emerson, supra note 17, at 439 (“Both [ad hoc and definitional] 
balancing undertake to weigh the individual and social interests in free expression against other 
interests of a different kind and therefore are subject to the same objections.”). 
 78. See Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 980 n.230.  Dean Aleinikoff bases his assertion that 
definitional and ad hoc balancing are similar on the fact that the Court has created different 
definitional rules in defamation cases, based on the difference in the underlying facts.  See infra Part 
III.E. 
 79. Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 948.  See also Emerson, supra note 17, at 439 (“Both [ad hoc 
and definitional] balancing undertake to weigh the individual and social interests in free expression 
against other interest of a different kind, and therefore are subject to the same objections.”). 
 80. See Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 972-83. 
 81. See id. at 984-95. 
 82. Id. at 972. 
 83. Id.  Dean Aleinikoff says that “[b]alancing must demand the development of a scale of 
values external to the Justices’ personal preferences.”  Id. at 973.  However, although “[i]n the 
search for an external scale . . . the modern Court has relied upon several sources that seem 
sensible[,] [n]othing in the ‘external’ sources offers a clue about how to compare differently derived 
values.”  Id. at 974-75. 
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large [but] . . . .in practice the Court never makes a full inventory of the 
relevant interests,”84 and often fails to “place the interests of [all] holders 
of the relevant interests . . . on the scale.”85 In addition, “[b]alancing 
opinions typically pit individual against government interests, [but] 
[t]his characterization . . . is arbitrary [because] [i]nterests may be 
conceived of in both public and private terms.”86 
He also argues that there are external issues with balancing that 
“implicate[] deeper questions about the role of the Court and the nature 
of judicial review.”87 First, there is the role of the Court in assigning 
value to legislation.88 Second, “[b]alancing . . . undermine[s]  our usual 
understanding of constitutional law as an interpretive enterprise;”89 
among other things, it “does not require the Court to develop and defend 
a theoretical understanding of a constitutional provision.”90 Finally, he 
asserts that balancing often “has the effect of distancing us from . . . 
discourse . . . [on] the basic questions of social and political justice—
such as the meaning of liberty, fairness, and justice—through the 
discussion of constitutional issues.”91 
 
 84. Id. at 977.  He maintains that “taking balancing seriously would seem to demand the kind 
of investigation of the world that courts are unable or unwilling to undertake.”  Id. at 978. 
 85. Id. at 978. This would include non-parties, but Dean Aleinikoff says to include them 
would result in “an unwieldy litigation process . . . and the cost of constitutional litigation would 
skyrocket.”  Id.  Consequently, to “mak[e] balancing work, the Court has adopted a truncated form 
that ought not to be acceptable to the conscientious balancer.”  Id. at 978-79. 
 86. Id. at 981.  Dean Aleinikoff argues that “[t]he individual interest in commutating one’s 
ideas to others may also be stated as a societal interest in a diverse marketplace of ideas.”  Id.  Thus, 
where “public and private interests appear on both sides, there is little sense in seeing the balance in 
terms of individual versus government interests.”  Id. 
 87. Id. at 984. 
 88. See id. at 984-86.  He asserts that “[e]ven if the balancing court purports to accept the 
value that the legislature places on its own output, it cannot simply factor the legislature’s 
determination into a constitution calculus.”  Id. at 986. Instead, “it must first convert the 
constitutional value and the legislative value into a common currency.”  Id. The problem is “[h]ow 
does a court decide how ‘important’ a legislative or administrative policy is?”  Aleinikoff, supra 
note 11, at 986.  He maintains that “[b]alancers . . . must suggest reasons why judgments assigning a 
social value to legislation are within the capacity of courts.”  Id. 
 89. Id. at 988.  He says that [b]alancing is transforming constitutional discourse into a general 
discussion of the reasonableness of government conduct.”  Id. at 987. It also “undermines the 
checking and validating functions of constitutional law.”  Id. at 991. 
 90. Id. at 988.  Instead, “the Court searches the landscape for interests implicated by the case, 
identifies a few, and reaches a reasonable accommodation among them.”  Aleinikoff, supra note 11, 
at 988.  By “so doing, the Court largely ignores the usual stuff of constitutional law interpretation-
the investigation and manipulation of texts (such as constitutional language, prior cases, even-
perhaps-our ‘ethical tradition’).”  Id. 
 91. Id. at  988. This is so because “[i]n recent years – perhaps due to nagging criticisms about 
the problem of assigning weights - the Court has resorted with increasing frequency to the jargon of 
economics and policy science in an attempt to look non-wilful, scientific, and objective.”  Id. at 992.  
However: 
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Furthermore, Dean Aleinikoff argues that balancing is not 
necessary since other methodologies exist for resolving conflicts that 
arise in constitutional cases that do not involve balancing.92  For 
example, “‘exception[s]’” in constitutional cases “may best be 
understood not as resulting from a balance but as resting upon a 
principle internal to the constitutional provision” at issue.93  Other 
commentators agree that, in defining the scope of the First Amendment, 
the Court should not engage in balancing in the sense of a “head to head 
comparison”94 of government and speech interests. Instead, the 
determination should be made solely on whether the speech at issue is 
consistent with First Amendment values.95  Such values are derived from 
“the historical, political, and philosophical purposes that underlie the 
First Amendment.”96  The Court may employ “a number of interpretive 
techniques . . . [such as] text, structure, precedent, consequences, history, 
intent, our ‘ethical tradition,’ [and] fundamental values,”97 but the 
determination should be made “independently of an evaluation . . . of the 
state’s regulatory goals.”98 
The problem with this criticism is that, as a general rule, 
definitional balancing, when used as a methodology for determining the 
scope of the First Amendment speech clause, does not involve the kind 
of balancing that Dean Aleinikoff and many other commentators ascribe 
 
Scientifically styled opinions, written to answer charges of subjectivity, make us 
spectators as the Court places the various interests on the scales. The weighing 
mechanism remains a mystery, and the result is simply read off the machine. Scientific 
balancing decisions are neither opinions nor arguments that can engage us; they are 
demonstrations. 
Id. at 993. 
 92. Id. at 998. 
 93. Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 1000. 
 94. Id. at 945. 
 95. See Schauer, supra note 19, at 562 n.4 (favoring an approach that seeks to determine of 
the scope of the First Amendment by “asking whether this is an act, or an example of a type of act, 
that triggers the concerns of the first amendment . . . independently of an evaluation of the 
desirability of regulating that act”); Emerson, supra note 17, at 439 (similar); Faigman, supra note 
19, at 1524 (asserting that considering the government’s interest in defining the scope of the a 
constitutional right is “contrary to the fundamental operating  assumptions of the Constitution”). 
 96. See Geoffrey Stone, Content Regulations and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 189, 194 (1983). 
 97. Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 1002.  See also Faigman, supra note 19, at 1530-31 (arguing 
that in determining whether a constitutional right exists, the Court should look primarily to the text, 
but may also look at “supplemental authorities . . . as necessary to fill gaps in the text, including 
original intent (history), precedent, constitutional fact finding, constitutional scholarship, and 
contemporary values”). 
 98. See Schauer, supra note 19, at 562 n.4. 
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to it.99  More specifically, it does not involve balancing in the sense of 
“the identification, valuation, and . . . head-to-head comparison”100 of 
government regulatory and First Amendment interests.  Instead, 
definitional balancing involves striking a balance between the competing 
interests based on First Amendment values.101  The difference is between 
balancing as a process and balancing as the result of a non-balancing 
interpretive technique.  This point is illustrated by the different senses in 
which Dean Aleinikoff and Professor Nimmer use the term “balancing” 
and its application in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.102 
Dean Aleinikoff cites Sullivan as an example of a case that used “a 
non-balancing approach.”103  He asserts that the Court “clearly” did not 
engage in “balancing.”104  It “did not – as it has done in subsequent libel 
cases – balance First Amendment interests against interests in preserving 
reputation.”105  Instead, “[i]t settled on a ‘malice’ test . . . because it 
deemed such protection of the press necessary to effectuate fully the 
purposes of the Amendment.”106 Defamatory statements “based on 
‘knowing falsehood’ and ‘reckless disregard’ are not protected by the 
decision because they are not the types of speech that further First 
Amendment goals.”107 
It is true that the Court in Sullivan did not engage in balancing in 
the sense that Dean Aleinikoff uses the term. It did not reach its decision 
by a process of “identification, valuation, and comparison of competing 
interests.”108 In other words, as Professor Nimmer said, the Court did not 
engage in ad hoc balancing.109 However, the Court did engage in 
 
 99. See supra notes 20, 75, 77-98 and accompanying text. 
 100. Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 945. 
 101. See Nimmer, supra note 9, at 950 (“[T]he threshold question must be whether . . . speech 
values justify sweeping away [the government’s regulations].”). Cf. Stone, supra note 96, at 194  
[T]he Court begins with the presumption that the first amendment protects all 
communications and then creates areas of nonprotection only after it affirmatively finds 
that a particular class of speech does not sufficiently further the underlying purposes of 
the first amendment. . . . In attempting to strike the appropriate ‘balance’ . . . the Court 
considers a number of factors, including relative value of the speech and the risk of 
inadvertently chilling ‘high’ value expression.   
Id. See infra notes 104-343 and accompanying text. 
 102. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).  See supra notes 39-49 and accompanying 
text; see infra notes 103-119 and accompanying text. 
 103. Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 1001; N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 104. Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 1001. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 945. 
 109. Nimmer, supra note 9, at 943. 
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balancing in the sense that Professor Nimmer used the term.  
According to Professor Nimmer, the issue that the Court faced in 
Sullivan was “which segment of defamatory speech lies outside the 
umbrella of the First Amendment.”110 The answer to this question 
inherently involves “competing policy considerations.”111 On the one 
hand, there is “society’s interest in protecting reputations;”112 on the 
other hand, there is the First Amendment interest in free expression.113 In 
drawing the definitional line, the Court “implicitly” weighed the interest 
and struck a balance between them.114 However, in striking the balance, 
the Court’s focus was, as Professor Nimmer said it “must be,” on 
“whether the speech values justified . . . sweeping away most of the law 
of defamation where the statement is made against a public figure.”115 
Professor Nimmer agreed with Dean Aleinikoff’s conclusion that 
Sullivan was correctly decided because “speech values . . . are 
inapplicable to speech which the speaker knows to be false.”116 In other 
words, in drawing the definitional line the Court did not “balance” the 
competing interests by a process of  “identification, valuation, and 
comparison of [the] competing interests,”117 nor did it define the 
constitutional right based the government’s interest in regulation.118 
Instead, it struck a definitional balance between the competing interests 
based on its understanding of what the First Amendment requires. This 
is precisely the kind of non-balancing interpretive technique that Dean 
Aleinikoff and others argue is the appropriate way to interpret the 
Constitution.119 Consequently, definitional balancing does not raise the 
 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 949. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See id. at 943, 948-51.  Cf. TRIBE, supra note 16, § 12-2, at 792-93  
Any exclusion of a class of activities from first amendment safeguards represents an 
implicit conclusion that the government interests in regulating those activities are such as 
to justify whatever limitation is thereby placed on the free expression of ideas. . . . The 
question is whether the ‘balance’ should be struck for all cases in the process of framing 
particular categorical definitions, or whether the ‘balance’ should be calibrated anew on 
a case-by-case basis. 
Id. 
 115. Nimmer, supra note 9, at 950. 
 116. Id. at 951; N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 117. Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 945. 
 118. See Faigman, supra note 19, at 1524, 1555-62 (asserting that in practice the Court has 
applied definitional balancing in a way that defines the scope of the First Amendment speech clause 
based on the government’s regulatory interest and that to do so is “contrary to the fundamental 
operating  assumptions of the Constitution”).  See also infra notes 271-93 and accompanying text. 
 119. See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text. 
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kind of issues that so concern the critics of conventional balancing. 
B.  How Has the Court Applied Definitional Balancing? 
For the most part, in other instances where the Court has applied 
definitional balancing as a technique for drawing definitional lines 
within categories of speech, it has done so in the way it did in Sullivan.  
It has recognized, either explicitly or implicitly, that competing speech 
and governmental regulatory interests were at stake, but it has struck the 
definitional balance between them based on its understanding of First 
Amendment principles.120  Furthermore, contrary to the view of many 
commentators,121 it has struck the balance in a way that has expanded the 
scope of speech included within the First Amendment rather than 
restricted it. 
1.  Fighting Words 
Fighting words are one category of speech that is considered to be 
outside the scope of the First Amendment.  In Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, Chaplinsky was convicted of violating a state statute that 
made it a crime to “address any offensive, derisive, or annoying word to 
any other person who is lawfully in any . . . public place . . . [or to] call 
him any offensive or derisive name. . . .”122  He had exclaimed to the 
City Marshal: “‘You are a God damned racketeer’ and ‘a damned Fascist 
and the whole government of Rochester are Fascist or agents of 
Fascists.’”123  In upholding Chaplinsky’s conviction, the Court stated in 
a well known dictum: 
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, 
the prevention, and punishment of which has never been thought to 
raise any Constitutional problems. These include the lewd and 
obscene, the profane, the libelous and the insulting or ‘fighting words’ 
– those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an 
immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such 
utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas and are of 
such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be 
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order 
 
 120. Cf. Schauer, Boundaries, supra note 3, at 1777 n.52 (“[In] obscenity, commercial 
advertising, and defamation cases . . . the initial determination that speech was not covered by the 
First Amendment was seemingly made solely on the basis of the absence of First Amendment value, 
without regard to the strength of the state’s interest in regulation.”). 
 121. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 122. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569 (1942). 
 123. Id. 
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and morality.124 
This dictum seems to have been the origin of the notion that definitional 
balancing is a technique that limits the scope of the First Amendment 
through a comparative balancing of competing speech and government 
regulatory interests.125 However, the clear import of the dictum is that 
fighting words are excluded from the First Amendment because they are 
insufficiently related to the speech values of an “exposition of ideas” and 
the search for “truth.”126 This is reinforced by the Court’s additional 
observation that “[r]esort to epithets or personal abuse is not in any 
proper sense communication of information or opinion safeguarded by 
the Constitution.”127  As the Court in a later case said, such words 
“embod[y] a particularly intolerable (and socially unnecessary) mode of 
expressing whatever idea the speaker wishes to convey.”128 
For present purposes, it is irrelevant whether the Court was correct 
in its interpretation of the First Amendment.129  The point is that the 
Court excluded fighting words from the First Amendment not because 
on “balance” they were outweighed by the “social interest in order and 
morality,” but rather the Court excluded them from the First Amendment 
because it thought that such speech lacked sufficient speech value.130 
 
 124. Id. at 571-72 (citing ZACHARIAH CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 149 
(1941)).  Shortly after Chaplinsky, the Court added commercial advertising to the categories of  
speech that are excluded from the First Amendment.  See Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 
(1942), overruled by Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485 (1984). 
 125. See sources cited supra notes 20, 75, 77. 
 126. See Donald A. Downs, Skokie Revisited: Hate Group Speech and the First Amendment, 
60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 629, 631 (1985) (in Chaplinsky, “[t]he Court excluded [fighting words] 
from the Constitution’s protection because protecting it would be inconsistent with the values and 
goals of the First Amendment”).  Cf. TRIBE, supra note 16, § 12-8, at 837 (“The premise that speech 
has special value only in the context of dialogue underlies the dictum of . . . Chaplinsky. . . .”). 
 127. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.  See TRIBE, supra note 16, § 12-8, at 839 (“The overriding 
idea in Chaplinsky is . . . the isolation of those ‘utterances [that] are no essential part of any 
exposition of ideas [and] of . . . slight social value as a step to truth.’”) (brackets and ellipsis in 
original). 
 128. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 393 (1992). 
 129. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 20, at 626 (“‘[F]ighting words’ represent a significant means 
of self-realization, whether or not they can be considered a means of attaining some elusive 
‘truth.’”); Emerson, supra note 17, at 443 (“The Chaplinsky dictum . . . is totally incompatible with 
modern first amendment theory . . . [because] [i]t makes the exclusions turn on whether the 
expression has ‘social value as a step to truth.’”). 
 130. But cf. Schauer, Boundaries, supra note 3, at 1777, 1777 n. 52.  
To the Court, the fighting words Chaplinsky uttered were regulable not because the state 
interest in controlling them was so powerful as to trump the First Amendment, but 
because the words lay entirely outside the scope of the First Amendment.”  However, 
“Chaplinsky is not quite as clean a case on this score . . . because the Chaplinsky 
language makes reference both to the degree of the injury and to the lack of First 
Amendment value. 
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On its face, the fighting words doctrine seems speech restrictive.  
Chaplinsky’s rant certainly can be viewed as a “means of self-
realization”131 as well as legitimate government criticism.132  In any 
event, by today’s standards his words seem mild, if not quaint.  
However, since Chaplinsky, the Court has actually expanded the scope 
of protection afforded to such speech, by “narrow[ing]” the definitional 
line between fighting words that are excluded from the First Amendment 
and speech that remains included.133 
To constitute excluded fighting words, the words must do more 
than merely “annoy or offend;”134 they must be “inherently 
inflammatory.”135  They also must amount to “a direct personal insult” 
that is “directed to the person of the hearer”136 and must “have a direct 
tendency to cause acts of violence [by that person]”137 so as “to incite an 
immediate breach of the peace.”138  The question is whether the words 
are such as “to provoke the average person to retaliation.”139  
Furthermore, statutes that purport to punish such speech must be 
narrowly drawn.140 Under these standards, the Court has refused to 
sustain any fighting words convictions in post Chaplinsky cases, many 
of which involved speech more provocative than Chaplinsky’s.141 
Perhaps the most significant narrowing of the definitional line 
occurred in R.A.V. v. St.Paul.142  In that case a teenager, along with 
others, burned a cross on the property of a black family.143  He was 
prosecuted under an ordinance that provided “‘[w]hoever places on . . . 
 
Id. 
 131. Redish, supra note 20, at 626. 
 132. See Stephen W. Gard, Fighting Words As Free Speech, 58 WASH. U. L.Q. 531, 542 
(1980). 
 133. See TRIBE, supra note 16, § 12-10 at 850 (“More recent Supreme Court decisions . . . 
made clear that the ‘fighting words’ exception . . . must be narrowly construed.”); id. at 850-51 
nn.5-6 (collecting cases). 
 134. See Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 465 (1987). 
 135. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969). 
 136. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (quoting in part Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 
U.S. 296, 309 (1940)). 
 137. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 524 (1972). 
 138. Id. at 525 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)). 
 139. Street, 394 U.S. at 592 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 574). 
 140. See, e.g., Gooding, 405 U.S. at 519 (discussing overbreath). 
 141. See, e.g., id. at 519 n.1 (addressed to police officers: “‘White son of a bitch, I’ll kill you.’” 
“‘You son of a bitch, I’ll choke you to death.’” “‘You son of a bitch, if you ever put your hands on 
me again, I’ll cut you all to pieces.’”) (statute held overbroad); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107 
(1973) (words not addressed to any particular person included “‘We’ll take the fucking streets later’ 
or ‘We’ll take the fucking streets again’”). 
 142. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
 143. Id. at 379. 
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private property . . . a burning cross . . . which one knows or has reason 
to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of 
race, color, creed, religion, or gender commits disorderly conduct and 
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”144  The majority held that statute was 
was unconstitutional on its face, even if it applied only to proscribable 
fighting words, because it was content based.145 
In reaching its conclusion, the majority created a definitional rule 
based on an interpretation of the First Amendment. They held that 
categories of speech that are otherwise excluded from First Amendment 
protection are not “entirely invisible to the Constitution.”146  First 
Amendment values prohibit government regulation of speech simply 
because the government does not like the content of a speaker’s 
message, and this limitation applies even to otherwise unprotected 
speech.147  In other words, “the First Amendment imposes . . . a ‘content 
discrimination limitation’ upon a State’s prohibition of proscribable 
speech.”148  
Thus, government may only proscribe such speech if does so for the 
reasons that such speech is excluded from the First Amendment; it may 
not proscribe such speech because it does not like the content of the 
message expressed.149  The ordinance at issue was unconstitutional 
because the city did not proscribe fighting words for the reasons why 
such words are outside the scope of the First Amendment.  Instead, 
“it . . . proscribed fighting words of whatever manner that communicate 
messages of racial, gender, or religious intolerance,” i.e. it only 
proscribed fighting words that expressed a message it did not like.150  
 
 144. Id. at 380. 
 145. Id. at 381. Four Justices concurred in the result, but rejected the majority’s analysis. Id. at 
397 (White, J., concurring);  Id. at 415 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Id. at 416 (Stevens, J., 
concurring). 
 146. Id. at 383 (majority). 
 147. See id. at 383-84. 
 148. Id. at 387. The majority reasoned as follows: 
[T]he exclusion of ‘fighting words’ from the scope of the First Amendment simply 
means that, for purposes of that Amendment, the unprotected features of the words are, 
despite their verbal character, essentially a ‘nonspeech’ element of communication. 
Fighting words are thus analogous to a noisy sound truck: Each is . . . a ‘mode of 
speech’ . . . ; both can be used to convey an idea; but neither has, in and of itself, a claim 
on the First Amendment. As with the sound truck, however, so also with fighting words: 
The government may not regulate use based on hostility – or favoritism – towards the 
underlying message expressed. 
Id. at 386. 
 149. See id. at 382-90. 
 150. Id. at 393-94.  The city “assert[ed] that a general ‘fighting words’ law would not meet the 
city’s needs because only a content-specific measure can communicate to minority groups that the  
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This, the majority held, the city could not do under the First 
Amendment.151 
Although R.A.V. arose in the context of fighting words, the rule 
applies to all categories of speech that are otherwise deemed not speech 
in the constitutional sense. Thus, such speech is not included within the 
First Amendment only to the extent of the underlying reasons why such 
speech is excluded.152  This seems a very speech protective way of 
drawing the definitional line between speech that is encompassed within 
the First Amendment and speech that is not. 
2.  Speech That Provokes a Hostile Audience 
Speech that provokes a hostile audience is another category of 
speech that is not included within the First Amendment. However, the 
Court has drawn the definitional line between such speech that is 
excluded, and speech that is included, based on speech values and in a 
speech protective way. The Court has said that government may 
proscribe speech that provokes a hostile audience where there exists a 
“clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with traffic upon 
the public streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or 
order.”153 Thus, speech is unprotected where “the speaker passes the 
bounds of argument or persuasion and undertakes incitement to riot.”154  
On the other hand, speech that “stir[s] people to anger, invite[s] public 
dispute, or [brings] about a condition of unrest”155 is protected since “a 
function of free speech under our system of government is to invite 
dispute.”156 In such cases “the ordinary murmurings and objections of a 
hostile audience cannot be allowed to silence a speaker.”157 
 
‘group hatred’ aspect of such speech ‘is not condoned by the majority.’”  Id. at 392. 
 151. See id. at 391-94. 
 152. This slightly modifies the assertion made supra text accompanying note 5. 
 153. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940). 
 154. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 321 (1951). 
 155. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 238 (1963) (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 
337 U.S. 1, 5 (1949)). 
 156. Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 4. 
 157. Feiner, 340 U.S. at 320.  Applying the standards set out in the text, the Court has reversed 
convictions in the following situations: (1) where the speaker “aroused animosity” but there was 
“no . . . clear and present menace to public peace and order,” Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 311; (2) the 
speaker was convicted for inviting a “dispute,” Terminiello, 337 U.S. at 3; (3) “there was no 
violence or threat of violence [by demonstrators] or . . . the crowd watching them [and]  police 
protection was ‘ample,’ Edwards, 372 U.S. at 236; Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 550-51 (1965) 
(same); and (4) where “onlookers became unruly” but there was “no evidence [available] that 
petitioner’s conduct was disorderly.” Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 111, 112 (1969).  
However, in Feiner, the Court thought  that “the speaker [had] passe[ed] the bounds of argument or 
22
Akron Law Review, Vol. 39 [2006], Iss. 2, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol39/iss2/5
DEUTSCH1.DOC 4/25/2006  6:12:38 PM 
2006] “DEFINITIONAL BALANCING” AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 505 
3.  Advocacy of Illegal Action 
The Court has also drawn, in a speech protective way, based on 
speech values, the definitional line between advocacy of illegal action 
that is included, and such speech that is excluded, from the First 
Amendment. In Brandenburg v. Ohio, the Court created the definitional 
rule that “the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do 
not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or 
of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or 
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce 
such action.”158 However, the Court did not expressly explain why it 
drew the line at this point, but it did indicate that the rule had its roots in 
prior decisions.159 Those cases indicate that the Brandenburg rule is 
based on the speech values at stake as articulated in the classic opinions 
of Judge Hand and Justices Holmes and Brandeis160 
The prevailing view in the pre-Brandenburg cases was that, in 
proscribing advocacy of  illegal action, “it was not essential that . . . 
immediate execution should be advocated”161 and that “success or 
probability of success [was not] the criterion.”162  This position was 
often based on the government’s interest in self preservation.163  On the 
other hand, Judge Hand argued that only “direct advocacy” of illegal 
action could be proscribed.164  He thought that a lesser standard would 
have “as a consequence the suppression of all hostile criticism, and of all 
 
persuasion and undert[ook] incitement to riot” and that “disorder” was “imminen[t].” Feiner, 340 
U.S. at 321. 
 158. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
 159. Id. 
 160. See TRIBE, supra note 16, § 12-10, at 848 (Brandenburg is a “synthesis, combining the 
best of Hand’s views with the best of Holmes’ and Brandeis’”). 
 161. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 671-72 (1925). 
 162. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509-10 (1951). 
 163. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 669.  Thus, it was argued that: 
[U]tterances inciting to the overthrow of organized government by unlawful means, 
present a sufficient danger of substantive evil to bring their punishment within the range 
of legislative discretion . . . . Such utterances, by their very nature, involve danger to the 
public peace and to the security of the State. They threaten breaches of the peace and 
ultimate revolution.  And the immediate danger is none the less real and substantial 
because the effect of a given utterance cannot be accurately foreseen. . . .  It cannot 
reasonably be required to defer the adoption of measures for its own peace and safety 
until the revolutionary utterances lead to actual disturbances of the public peace or 
imminent and immediate danger of its own destruction; but it may, in the exercise of its 
judgment, suppress the threatened danger in its incipiency. 
Id. 
 164. Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), rev’d 264 F. 24 (2d Cir 
1917). 
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opinion except what encouraged and supported the existing policies, or 
which fell within the range of temperate argument.”165 
In addition to Judge Hand, Justices Holmes and Brandeis thought 
that “[e]very idea is an incitement.”166  The drafters of the Constitution 
were themselves revolutionaries.167  They “were not cowards.”168  “They 
did not fear political change [and] [t]hey did not exalt order at the cost of 
liberty.”169  Instead: 
They valued liberty both as an end and as a means. . . . They believed 
that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means 
indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that 
without free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with 
them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the 
dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom 
is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that 
this should be a fundamental principle of the American government.  
But they knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of 
punishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage 
thought, hope, and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that 
repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the 
path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed 
grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil 
counsels is good ones. . . . Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of 
governing majorities, they amended the Constitution so that free 
speech and assembly should be guaranteed.170  
Consequently, “[f]ear of serious injury cannot alone justify 
suppression of free speech and assembly.”171  “Only an emergency can 
justify repression.”172  “The fact that speech is likely to result in some 
violence or in destruction of property is not enough to justify its 
suppression.”173 “Among free men, the deterrents ordinarily to be 
applied to prevent crime are education and punishment for violations of 
law, not abridgement of the rights of free speech and assembly.”174 Thus, 
 
 165. Id. at 539-40. 
 166. Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 673 (Holmes, J., joined by Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 167. See, Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J., 
concurring), overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 375-76. 
 171. Id. at 376. 
 172. Id. at 377.  See also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., 
joined by Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 173. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 378 (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J., concurring). 
 174. Id. 
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in the Holmes and Brandeis view: 
To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground 
to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There 
must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is 
imminent. There must be reasonable grounds to believe that the evil to 
be prevented is a serious one.175 
Obviously the Court in Brandenburg concluded that the speech 
values at stake, that Hand and Holmes and Brandeis articulated, required 
that advocacy of illegal action be proscribed only where there is 
advocacy of immediate action, and there is a likelihood of success. 
Consequently, under Brandenburg’s definitional rule, speech that 
advocates overthrowing lawful government, or other illegal action, is 
speech within the meaning of First Amendment, provided that “such 
advocacy is [not] directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless 
action [or] is [not] likely to incite or produce such action.”176  Again, this 
seems a very speech protective way of drawing the definitional line 
between advocacy of illegal action that is encompassed within the First 
Amendment and such speech that is not. 
4.  Threatening Speech 
Threatening speech is another category of speech that is not 
considered speech in the constitutional sense.  Here, too, the Court has 
drawn, in a speech protective fashion, based on speech values, the 
definitional line between threats that are proscribable based on their 
content, and speech that remains included within the First Amendment.  
The Court has recognized that government has a strong interest in 
protecting its citizens from threats.177  However, it has also recognized 
that the definition of constitutionally proscribable threats must be made 
in light of the speech values at stake.178  These values include “‘a 
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public 
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well 
include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp 
attacks.’”179 
Consequently, the Court has held that it is only “true ‘threat[s]’” 
 
 175. Id. at 376. 
 176. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
 177. See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992). 
 178. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969). 
 179. Id. at 708 (quoting N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). 
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that are outside the scope of the First Amendment.180  Such threats 
“encompass those statements where the speaker means to communicate 
a serious expression of intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to 
an individual or a group of individuals.”181  Furthermore, “[t]he speaker 
need not actually intend to carry out the threat.”182  Instead, “a 
prohibition against true threats ‘protect[s] individuals from the fear of 
violence’ and ‘from the disruption that fear engenders’ in addition to 
protecting people ‘from the possibility that the threatened violence will 
occur.’”183  Thus, “intimidation . . . where a speaker directs a threat to a 
person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of 
bodily harm or death”184 is also a true threat. 
On the other hand, speech that amounts to “political hyperbole,”185 
“creat[es] anger or resentment,”186 or is “insulting, or even 
outrageous,”187 or that is “menacing”188 may not, in and of themselves, 
amount to constitutionally proscribable true threats.  For example, 
burning a cross at a Ku Klux Klan rally may be treated as “core political 
speech” within the scope of the First Amendment,189 even though it has 
been argued that “[i]n our culture, cross burning has almost invariably 
meant lawlessness and understandably instills in its victims well-
grounded fear of physical violence.”190  The fact that such a cross 
burning “arouses a sense of anger or hatred” is not enough to make it a 
 
 180. Id. 
 181. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). 
 182. Id. 359-60. 
 183. Id. at 360 (quoting R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992)). 
 184. Id. 
 185. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 706, 707-08 (1969) (A potential draftee stated that if 
he was drafted and given a gun “the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J”). 
 186. Black, 538 U.S. at 366 (cross burning). 
 187. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 774 (1994) (abortion protesters 
approaching patients at an abortion clinic). 
 188. Rothchild, supra note 9, at 223.  Rothchild makes the point that certain speech that he 
calls “menacing,” such as that involved in the Nuremberg Files case may not amount to true threats.  
Id.  In that case, anti-abortion activists, among other things, created and posted on the internet a 
poster that listed the names, addresses, and phone numbers of abortion providers, exclaimed that 
abortion is like a “war crime,” proclaimed that the providers were “GUILTY of crimes against 
humanity,” and “offer[ed] a ‘$ 5,000 reward’ for ‘information leading to the arrest, conviction and 
revocation of license to practice medicine.’”  Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life 
Activists, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1186 (D. Or. 1998).  Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals sitting en banc held 6-5 that the Nuremberg Files amounted to a proscribable threat.  
Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. den. 
539 U.S. 958 (2003). 
 189. Black, 538 U.S. at 365. 
 190. Id. at 391 (Thomas, J. dissenting). 
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true threat.191 
5.  Offensive Speech 
Offensive, non-erotic speech is another category of speech where 
the Court has created a definitional rule, based on speech values, that has 
expanded the scope of speech included within the First Amendment.  In 
Cohen v. California,192 Cohen wore a jacket in the hallway outside a 
courtroom in a county courthouse that bore the term “Fuck the Draft.”193  
He was convicted of violating a statute that “prohibit[ed] ‘maliciously 
and willfully disturb[ing] the peace or quiet of any neighborhood or 
person . . . by offensive conduct.’”194 
In Chaplinsky, the Court mentioned profane speech as a category of 
speech that was not included within the First Amendment; it said that the 
relationship between such speech and the First Amendment values of the 
“exposition of ideas” and search for “truth” was “slight.”195 However, 
the Court in Cohen engaged in a more detailed analysis of whether 
speech that some might find offensive, which presumably would include 
profanity,196 is consistent with First Amendment values. 
The Court recognized that government might have some interest in 
“maintain[ing] . . . a suitable level of discourse within the body 
politic.”197  However, it held that speech values required that offensive 
speech be included within the First Amendment.  The Court noted that, 
as a general “rule . . .  governmental bodies may not proscribe the form 
or content of individual expression.”198  The  reason for this rule is that: 
[T]he constitutional right of free expression] is designed and intended 
to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, 
putting the decision as to what views shall be voiced largely into the 
hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will 
ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity 
and in the belief that no approach would comport with the premise of 
 
 191. See id. at 366. 
 192. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
 193. Id. at 16. 
 194. Id. (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 415 (West 1971)) (ellipsis in original). 
 195. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).  See supra text 
accompanying note 124. 
 196. See Shaman, Low Value Speech, supra note 9, at 312-13 (equating profanity with 
offensive speech). 
 197. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 23. 
 198. Id. at 24. 
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individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests.199 
Furthermore, although “[t]o many, the immediate consequence of 
this freedom may often appear to be only verbal tumult, discord, and 
even offensive utterance[,] [t]hese are . . . in truth necessary side effects 
of the broader enduring values which the process of open debate permits 
us to achieve.”200  Consequently, “so long as the means are peaceful, the 
communication need not meet standards of acceptability.”201 
More specifically, the Court held that there was “no readily 
ascertainable general principle”202 for determining what speech is 
offensive. “[O]ne can[not] forbid particular words without also running a 
substantial risk of suppressing ideas,” and the Constitution is 
“solicitous” of both the “cognitive content” and “emotive function” of 
words.203  Thus, as a result of the definitional balance struck in Cohen, 
offensive speech is deemed to be speech in the constitutional sense.204 
6.  Commercial Speech 
Commercial speech is another category where the Court has created 
a definitional rule, based on speech values, that has expanded the scope 
of speech that is deemed speech within the meaning of the Constitution.  
Initially, the Court assumed that commercial speech was a category of 
speech that was entirely excluded from the First Amendment.205  
 
 199. Id. (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927) overruled in part by 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)). 
 200. Id. at 24-25. 
 201. Id. at 25. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id (quoting Org. for Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971).  
 204. Government’s attempts to regulate constitutionally protected offensive speech has had 
mixed results. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004) (affirming the granting of a preliminary 
injunction enjoining the enforcement of the Child Online Protection Act, 112 Stat. 2681-736); 
Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996) (upholding section 10 (a), 
and striking down sections 10 (b) and (c) of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and 
Competition Act of 1992, 47 U.S.C. §§ 532 (h), (j), 531 (1988)); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 
726 (1978) (upholding the FCC’s authority to regulate indecent and profane radio broadcasts); Reno 
v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (holding unconstitutional the Communications Decency Act of 
1996, 47 U.S.C. § 223 (Supp. II 1994)); Sable Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) 
(holding that the amendment to the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (1998), was 
unconstitutional to the extent that it prohibits dial-a-porn telephone messages that are indecent, but 
not obscene); United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc, 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (upholding the 
District Court’s conclusion that section 5 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 561 
(2000), violated the First Amendment). 
 205. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942), overruled by Bose Corp. v. Consumers 
Union, 466 U.S. 485 (1984) (“[T]he constitution imposes no . . . restraint[s] on government as 
respects purely commercial advertising.”). 
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However, in Virginia State Board Of Pharmacy v. Citizens Consumer 
Council206 the Court recognized the “substantial” speech values inherent 
in commercial speech.207 
The case involved a challenge to a state law that prohibited licensed 
pharmacists from advertising prescription drug prices.  In considering 
the speech values involved in such advertisements, the Court concluded 
that “speech which does ‘no more than propose a commercial 
transaction’ . . . is [not] so removed from any ‘exposition of ideas,’ and 
from ‘truth, science, morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of 
liberal sentiments on the administration of Government,’ that it lacks all 
protection.”208  It reasoned that individuals and society in general had a 
“strong interest in the free flow of [such] commercial information.”209  
Buyers have an interest in “where their scarce dollars are best spent.”210 
In addition, society has an interest in “intelligent and well informed” 
decision making with respect to the buying and selling of goods.211  In 
this regard, “the free flow of commercial information is indispensable . . 
. to the proper allocation of resources in a free enterprise system.”212  
Such information “is also indispensable to the formation of intelligent 
opinions as to how that system ought to be regulated or altered.”213  The 
Court concluded that “even if the First Amendment were to be thought 
to be primarily an instrument to enlighten public decision-making in a 
democracy, we could not say that the free flow of information does not 
serve that goal.”214 
The Court recognized the State’s rationale for prohibiting such 
advertisements.215  The State argued that such a ban was necessary to 
preserve “a high degree of professionalism on the part of licensed 
pharmacists.”216  It maintained that advertising would result in 
“aggressive price competition”217 that would put the “painstaking and 
 
 206. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
 207. Id. 762-66; cf. Eberle, supra note 73, at 453  (noting that in Virginia State Bd. of 
Pharmacy “[t]he Court employed a web of interdependent values . . . [including] [t]ruth, self-
realization, and autonomy . . . which support and are supported by democracy, self-government, 
dignity, equality and liberty”). 
 208. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 (internal citations omitted). 
 209. See id. at 763-65. 
 210. Id. at 763. 
 211. Id. at 765. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. See id. at 766-70. 
 216. Id. at 766. 
 217. Id. at 767. 
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conscientious pharmacist . . . out of business,” increase drug costs, 
destroy the “stable pharmacist-customer relationship” which would 
make it “impossible” to monitor patients drugs, and “reduce the 
pharmacist’s status to that of a mere retailer.”218 However, the Court 
noted that there was “an alternative to this highly paternalistic 
approach.”219  A better way to look at the problem was “to assume that 
this information is not itself harmful, that people will perceive their own 
best interest if only they are well enough informed, and that the best 
means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather than 
to close them.”220  Nonetheless, it held that “the choice among these 
alternative approaches is not ours to make or [the state’s;] [i]t is 
precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing 
information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, that 
the First Amendment makes for us.”221 
The Court drew the definitional line at truthful, non-deceptive 
commercial speech about a lawful product, as compared to all 
commercial speech.222  In doing so, the Court noted the differences 
between commercial speech and political speech.  It pointed out that the 
former is “more easily verifiable by its disseminator . . . [who] 
presumably knows more about [it] than anyone else” and that because of 
the profit motive, it is also “more durable” and thus “there is little 
likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation and foregone 
entirely.”223  Consequently, “the greater objectivity and hardiness of 
commercial speech may make it less necessary to tolerate inaccurate 
statements for fear of silencing the speaker,” and it “may also make it 
appropriate to require that a commercial message appear in such a form, 
or include such additional information, warnings, and disclaimers, as are 
necessary to prevent its being deceptive.”224  Whether or not the Court 
drew the definitional line in the appropriate place,225 there can be no 
 
 218. Id. at 768. 
 219. Id. at 770. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. See id. at 773. 
 223. Id. at 772 n.24. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Commentators are divided on whether and to what extent commercial speech should be 
deemed speech in the constitutional sense.  For example, compare Emerson, supra note 17, at 460 
(“It is by no means self-evident that commercial speech will fit into the system at all. Commercial 
speech does not promote the underlying values of the system in the same manner as does other 
expression.”) with Redish, supra note 20, at 635 (“Even though . . . analysis may justify many forms 
of regulation of false and misleading advertising, it does not support attempts to draw additional 
distinctions between commercial and other forms of expression.”). 
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doubt that in holding that truthful, non-deceptive commercial speech 
about a lawful product was speech in the constitutional sense, the Court 
expanded the scope of speech included within the First Amendment, and 
that it did so based on speech values rather than on a comparative 
balancing of interest.226 
7.  Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress 
The Court has also created a definitional rule, based on speech 
values, that has expanded the scope of speech encompassed within the 
First Amendment with respect to the tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. In Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 227 the Court 
recognized that the government has an important interest in 
compensating the victims of the tort. “Generally speaking the law does 
not regard the intent to inflict emotional distress as one which should 
receive much solicitude, and it is quite understandable that most if not 
all jurisdictions have chosen to make it civilly culpable where the 
conduct in question is sufficiently ‘outrageous.’”228 
However, the Court drew the definitional line based on the 
important speech values at stake even with speech that meets the 
elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress.   
The sort of robust political debate encouraged by the First Amendment 
is bound to produce speech that is critical of those who hold public 
office or those public figures who are ‘intimately involved in the 
resolution of important public questions or, by reason of their fame, 
shape events in areas of concern to society at large.’229  
In such debates “many things [are] done with motives that are less than 
admirable.”230 Nonetheless, the First Amendment protects speech “even 
when a speaker or writer is motivated by hatred or ill-will.”231 
The reason for this protection is to encourage public debate on 
public issues.232 Such debate “‘will not be uninhibited if the speaker 
must run the risk that it will be proved in court that he spoke out of 
 
 226. The current standards for government regulation of constitutionally protected truthful, 
non-deceptive commercial speech about a lawful product are set out in Central Hudson Gas & 
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
 227. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
 228. Id. at 53. 
 229. Id. at 51 (quoting Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., 
concurring)). 
 230. Id. at 53. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
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hatred; even if he did speak out of hatred, utterances honestly believed 
contribute to the free interchange of ideas and the ascertainment of 
truth.’”233  Consequently, the Court held that “public figures and public 
officials may not recover for the tort of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress . . . without showing . . . that the publication contains 
a false statement of fact which was made with ‘actual malice.’”234  Such 
a rule is “necessary to give adequate ‘breathing space’ to the freedoms 
protected by the First Amendment.”235 
8.  Invasion of Privacy 
a.  False Light Privacy 
The Court has also applied definitional balancing in a speech 
protective way, based on speech values, to expand the scope of 
constitutionally protected speech with respect to the tort of invasion of 
privacy by placing the plaintiff in a false light. Government has an 
obvious interest in protecting is citizens “from society’s searching 
eye.”236 However, in Time, Inc. v. Hill, the Court  held that the speech 
values at stake required a definitional rule that such speech is included 
within the scope of the First Amendment with respect to matters of 
public concern unless published with actual malice.237 
The Court reasoned that the First Amendment “guarantees for 
speech and press are not the preserve of political expression,” but instead 
also generally apply to matters of public concern.238  Just as in the 
former, false statements are “inevitable” in the latter.239 Consequently, 
freedom of speech needs “‘breathing space’ . . . ‘to survive.’”240  
Otherwise speakers might be deterred from commenting on matters of 
public concern because of fear of law suits. 241 
In addition, the Court thought that it would “create a grave risk of 
serious impairment of the indispensable service of a free press . . . [to] 
saddle the press with the impossible burden of verifying to a certainty 
the facts associated in news articles with a person’s name, picture or 
 
 233. Id. (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73 (1964). 
 234. Id. at 56. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Nimmer, supra note 9, at 958. 
 237. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1966). 
 238. Id. at 388. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. (quoting N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 255, 271-72 (1964)). 
 241. See id. at 389. 
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portrait, particularly as related to a nondefamatory matter.”242  Even “[a] 
negligence test would place on the press the intolerable burden of 
guessing how a jury might assess the reasonableness of steps taken by it 
to verify the accuracy of every reference to a name, picture or 
portrait.”243 
b.  Disclosure of Private Facts 
Applying definitional balancing, the Court again expanded the 
scope of speech encompassed within the First Amendment, based on 
First Amendment values, with respect to the privacy tort of disclosing 
private facts. In Cox Broadcasting v. Cohn, a reporter, in violation of a 
state statute, broadcasted the name of a rape victim that he had obtained 
from public records.244  The Court recognized that government has an 
interest in restricting such speech.  It said that “there is a zone of privacy 
surrounding every individual, a zone within which the State may protect 
him from intrusion by the press, with all its attendant publicity.”245  It 
also noted that a person’s “right to be free from unwanted publicity 
about his private affairs, which, although wholly true, would be 
offensive to a person of ordinary sensibilities”246 is “plainly rooted in the 
traditions and significant concerns of our society.”247 
Nonetheless, it drew the definitional line based on First 
Amendment values.  It noted the interest of a “free press . . . [was also] 
plainly rooted in the traditions and significant concerns of our 
society.”248  Furthermore: 
The publication of truthful information available on the public record 
contains none of the indicia of those limited categories of expression, 
such as ‘fighting’ words, which ‘are no essential part of any exposition 
of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any 
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the 
social interest in order and morality.’249 
To the contrary, the Court reasoned that: 
 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id.  However, Professor Nimmer thought that the Court protected too much speech in Hill.  
See Nimmer, supra note 9, at 956-67.  See also infra Part III.C. 
 244. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 471-73 (1975). 
 245. Id. at 487. 
 246. Id. at 489. 
 247. Id. at 491. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. at 495 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)). 
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[I]n a society in which each individual has but limited time and 
resources with which to observe at first hand the operations of his 
government, he relies necessarily upon the press to bring to him in 
convenient form the facts of those operations.  Great responsibility is 
accordingly placed upon the news media to report fully and accurately 
the proceedings of government, and official records and documents 
open to the public are the basic data of governmental operations.  
Without the information provided by the press most of us and many of 
our representatives would be unable to vote intelligently or to register 
opinions on the administration of government generally. 250 
In addition, the Court was “reluctant to embark on a course that 
would make public records generally available to the media but forbid 
their publication if offensive to the sensibilities of the supposed 
reasonable man.”251   “Such a rule would make it very difficult for the 
media to inform citizens about the public business and yet stay within 
the law . . . [and] would invite timidity and self-censorship and very 
likely lead to the suppression of many items that would otherwise be 
published and that should be made available to the public.”252 
Consequently, the Court created the definitional rule that “the state 
may [not] impose sanctions on the accurate publication of the name of a 
rape victim obtained from public records – more specifically, from 
judicial records which are maintained in connection with a public 
prosecution and which themselves are open to public inspection.”253  In 
subsequent cases, the Court has broadened the definitional rule so that 
“if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of 
public significance then state officials may not constitutionally punish 
publication of the information, absent a need to further a state interest of 
the highest order.”254  Clearly, a rule that defines First Amendment 
speech to include the invasion of personal privacy, by publishing the 
name of rape victims, must be viewed as being quite speech protective. 
c.  Appropriation of Private Property 
Appropriation of private property is one of the few instances in 
which the Court has struck the definitional balance in a way that has 
 
 250. Id. at 491-92. 
 251. Id. at 496. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. at 491. 
 254. Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979) (juvenile offender).  See also 
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 528 (2001) (intercepted cellular phone conversation); Florida 
Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533  (1989) (rape victim). 
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narrowed the scope of speech included within the First Amendment.  
Here too, however, the Court based its decision on an interpretation of 
the First Amendment, rather than by a comparative balancing of 
interests.  Thus, in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting, a 
broadcast station, as part of a newscast, televised a performer’s an entire 
fifteen second act of him being shot out of a cannon.255  The Court held 
that under the circumstances the “First and Fourteen Amendments do not 
immunize the media when they broadcast a performer’s entire act 
without his consent.”256 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court recognized that there were 
competing interests involved.  It noted that the press needs “‘breathing 
room;’”257 that “entertainment, as well as news, enjoys First Amendment 
protection, and entertainment itself can be important news.”258  On the 
other hand, it recognized that “[t]he broadcast of a film of [the 
entertainer’s] entire act poses a substantial threat to the economic value 
of that performance . . . [,which] is the product of [his] own talents and 
energy, the end result of much time, effort, and expense.”259  “[U]njust 
enrichment” would result if others could broadcast the entertainer’s act 
without paying for it.260 The Court could see “[n]o social purpose . . . 
served by” such an occurrence.261  Furthermore, “protecting the 
proprietary interest of the individual in his act262 . . . provides an 
economic incentive for him to make the investment required to produce 
a performance of interest to the public.”263  This is in contrast to false 
light privacy, the invasion of which is constitutionally protected in the 
absence of actual malice, where what is at stake is “reputation, with the 
same overtones of mental distress.”264 
In the end, however, the Court based its decision on an 
interpretation of the First Amendment.265  It held that: 
The Constitution no more prevents a state from requiring [the press] to 
compensate [an entertainer] for broadcasting his act on television than 
 
 255. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 563-64 (1977). 
 256. Id. at 575. 
 257. Id. at 570 (quoting Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 351 N.E.2d 454, 461 (1976)). 
 258. Id. at 578. 
 259. Id. at 575. 
 260. Id. at 576. 
 261. Id.  
 262. Id. at 573. 
 263. Id. at 576. 
 264. Id. at 573. 
 265. Cf. TRIBE, supra note 16, § 12-14, at 888 (“[I]nterests in property and livelihood continue 
to rest on a powerful constitutional base . . . .”). 
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it would privilege [the press] to film and broadcast a copyrighted 
dramatic work without liability to the copyright owner, or to film and 
broadcast a prize fight, or a baseball game, where the promoters or the 
participants had other plans for publicizing the event.266 
Furthermore, the Court reasoned, the fact that the First Amendment 
excludes the television station’s broadcast, even as part of a newscast, 
would not deprive the public of an opportunity to view the 
entertainment;267 “the only question is who gets to do the publishing.”268 
This is in contrast to false light privacy where “the only way to protect 
the interest involved is to attempt to minimize publication of the 
damaging matter.”269 
9.  Obscene Speech 
The Court has also applied definitional balancing in obscenity 
cases. Chaplinsky specifically mentioned obscene speech as one of the 
categories of speech that is excluded from the First Amendment.270  
Nonetheless, the Court has drawn the definitional line with respect to 
obscenity in a way that actually expands the scope of constitutional 
protection given to sexually explicit speech.  In addition, while the Court 
has recognized that competing interests are at stake, it has struck the 
definitional balance between them based on its understanding of First 
Amendment values. 
However, Professor Faigman maintains that the Court excluded 
obscenity from the First Amendment based on the government’s 
regulatory interest rather than on its lack of speech value.271  He relies on 
Roth v. United States 272 and Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton 273 to 
support his position. He asserts that in Roth, the Court engaged in 
“‘balancing’” and that it “advanced the ‘social interest in order and 
morality’ to define speech.”274 He bases his argument primarily on the 
 
 266. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575 (internal citations omitted).  For a copyright case see Harper & 
Roe Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) (“[W]e see no warrant for 
expanding the doctrine of fair use to create what amounts to a public figure exception to 
copyright.”). 
 267. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 578. 
 268. Id. at 573. 
 269. Id. 
 270. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
 271. See David L. Faigman, Madisonian Balancing: A Theory of Constitutional Adjudication, 
88 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 677-81 (1994); Faigman, supra note 19, at 1555-62. 
 272. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
 273. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973). 
 274. Faigman, supra note 19, at 1558-59 (emphasis added). 
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fact that the Court in Roth quoted the Chaplinsky dictum that “obscene 
utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of 
such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be 
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order 
and morality.”275  The problem with this analysis is that, as noted earlier, 
the essence of the Chaplinsky dictum is that obscenity is not speech 
within the meaning of the First Amendment, not as the result of a 
comparative balancing of interests, but because obscene speech is 
inconsistent with the speech values of “an exposition of ideas” and the 
search for “truth.”276 
Furthermore, the proposition that the Court in Roth defined 
obscenity as outside the scope of constitutionally included speech based 
on an analysis of the First Amendment, rather than on a comparative 
balancing of the government’s regulatory interests and speech values, is 
reinforced by the Court’s reasoning: 
The guaranties of freedom of expression in effect in 10 of the 14 states 
which by 1792 had ratified the Constitution, gave no absolute 
protection for every utterance. Thirteen of the 14 States provided for 
the prosecution of libel, and all of those States made either blasphemy 
or profanity, or both, statutory crimes. . . .  In light of this history, it is 
apparent that the unconditional phrasing of the First Amendment was 
not intended to protect every utterance. . . . The protection given 
speech and the press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of 
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by 
the people. . . . All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social 
importance—unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful 
to the prevailing climate of opinion—have the full protection of the 
guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited 
area of more important interests.  But implicit in the history of the First 
Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming 
social importance. This rejection for that reason is mirrored in the 
universal judgment that obscenity should be restrained, reflected in the 
international agreement of over 50 nations, in the obscenity laws of all 
of the 48 States, and in the 20 obscenity laws enacted by the 
Congress. . . .277 
Professor Faigman recognizes that this reasoning is consistent “with 
traditional principles” and is “based . . . on the content of the First 
 
 275. Id. at 1558 (quoting Roth, 354 U.S at 485 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 
U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942))). 
 276. See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text. 
 277. Roth, 354 U.S. at 482-85. 
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Amendment,” but dismisses it on the ground that it “suffers many 
weaknesses.” 278  However, for present purposes it is irrelevant whether 
the Court’s reasoning was strong or weak. The point is that the Court 
based its decision on its view of “the content of the First Amendment,” 
and not on an assessment of the government’s regulatory interest. 
Any doubt that obscenity is excluded from the First Amendment 
because of its lack of First Amendment value and not because of the 
government’s interest in regulation, was seemingly dispelled in Miller v. 
California,279 a case that Professor Faigman does not discuss.  In that 
case, the Court observed that the “First Amendment protects works 
which, taken as a whole, have serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientific value, regardless of whether the government or a majority of 
the people approve of [them].”  It was designed “to assure unfettered 
interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social 
changes desired by the people.”280  It was not designed to protect “the 
public portrayal of hard-core sexual conduct for its own sake, and for the 
ensuing commercial gain.”281  The Court thought that “to equate the free 
and robust exchange of ideas and political debate with the commercial 
exploitation of obscene material demeans the grand conception of the 
First Amendment and its high purposes in the historic struggle for 
freedom.”282 
Despite Miller, Professor Faigman argues that in Paris Adult 
Theatre I, which was a companion case to Miller, “it [was] the 
government interests themselves that led the Court to define speech so as 
not to encompass obscenity.”283  Other commentators also have viewed 
Paris Adult Theatre I as a case in which the Court excluded obscenity 
from the First Amendment based on the government’s regulatory 
interests.284  However, the Court in Paris Adult Theatre I did not define 
 
 278. Faigman, supra note 19, at 1557-58.  His argument is that “[i]f [the Court’s] . . . historical 
argument . . . alone supported the exclusion of obscenity from First Amendment protection, 
profanity and blasphemy too should be excluded. But the Court has not, and is not likely to, read 
this history so conclusively.”  Id. at 1558. 
 279. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).     
 280. Id. at 34-35 (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. at 484). 
 281. Id. at 35 (emphasis added). 
 282. Id. at 34. 
 283. Faigman, supra note 271, at 678.  See also id, at 678 n.156; Faigman supra note 19, at 
1560-62. 
 284. See SHIFFRIN, supra note 16, at 22 (“Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton asserts that the 
distribution of obscene material is not protected under the first amendment because it debases 
human personality; it violates social interest in morality; it interferes with the state’s right to 
maintain a decent society.”) (emphasis removed); TRIBE, supra note 16, § 12-16 at 916-17 (similar); 
Redish, supra  note 20, at 637-39 (similar). 
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obscenity as outside the scope of the First Amendment.  The Court had 
already reached that conclusion in Miller on the ground that it lacks First 
Amendment value.285  In fact, Paris Adult Theatre I was not a First 
Amendment case at all. 
Just because speech is excluded from the First Amendment does not 
mean that it is devoid of all constitutional protection.  Like all 
legislation, regulations of speech that are excluded from the First 
Amendment must still pass “minimal due process” review.286  Thus, 
since Miller had reaffirmed that obscenity is excluded from the First 
Amendment, the government regulations in Paris Adult Theatre I did not 
have to meet First Amendment standards, they only had to meet rational 
basis review. Consequently, the issue in Paris Adult Theatre I was 
whether the government had “a legitimate interest” in regulating 
obscenity with respect to consenting adults.287  The Court held that the 
government did have legitimate interests in regulating such speech. 
“These include the interest of the public in the quality of life and the 
total community environment, the tone of commerce in the great city 
centers, and possibly, the public safety itself.”288  This was so even if 
“there [was] no scientific data which conclusively demonstrate that 
exposure to obscene material adversely affects men and women or their 
society.”289  The reason was that “[i]t [was] not for the Court to resolve 
empirical uncertainties underlying state legislation, save in the 
exceptional case where that legislation plainly impinges upon rights 
protected by the Constitution.”290  In other words, since Miller 
reaffirmed that obscenity is not a First Amendment speech “right,” the 
Court in Paris Adult Theatre I could, and did, simply defer to the 
government’s judgment of obscenity’s harms for purposes of rational 
basis review. Therefore, since Paris Adult Theatre I was not a First 
Amendment case, it does not undermine the proposition that the Court 
defined obscenity outside the scope of the First Amendment, as stated in 
Miller, because of obscenity’s lack of First Amendment value, rather 
than on the basis of a comparative analysis of the government’s 
 
 285. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 69 (1973).  In Paris Adult Theatre I, the 
Court cited Miller for the proposition that  “[w]e have today reaffirmed the basic holding of [Roth] 
that obscene material has no protection under the First Amendment.”  Id. 
 286. See TRIBE, supra note 16, §§12.2 at 792, 12.8 at 832. See also id. § 12.2 at 836 (noting 
that regulations of speech excluded from the First Amendment are “subject only to the barest due 
process scrutiny”). 
 287. See Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 69. 
 288. Id. at 58. 
 289. Id. at 60. 
 290. Id. 
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regulatory interests. 
Furthermore, not only did the Court strike the definitional balance 
based on First Amendment values, but it also drew the definitional line 
in a way that gives considerable protection to sexually explicit speech.  
The Court recognized “the inherent dangers of undertaking to regulate 
any form of expression.”291  Therefore, the Court drew the definitional 
line narrowly so as to “confine the permissible scope of . . . 
regulation.”292  Thus, under the so-called Miller test, obscenity is defined 
as sexually explicit material that  
‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards’ 
would find . . . , taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; 
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct 
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and . . . taken as a 
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.293 
Consequently, under the definitional line drawn in Miller, the 
commercial exploitation of “[p]atently offensive representations or 
descriptions of ultimate sex acts, . . . masturbation, excretory functions, 
and lewd exhibitions of the genitals” are all deemed to be speech within 
the meaning of the First Amendment – provided only that the “work, 
taken as a whole, [does not] lack[] serious literary, artistic, or scientific 
value.”294 This seems very speech protective.295 
10.  Child Pornography 
In New York v. Ferber, 296 the Court applied definitional balancing 
in a speech protective manner, to create a definitional rule with respect 
to child pornography.  However, whether the Court based its decision on 
a consideration of First Amendment values, rather than on a comparative 
balancing of competing interests, is somewhat problematical.  Some 
commentators have taken the latter position.297 
 
 291. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973). 
 292. Id. at 24. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. at 24-25. 
 295. Government may still regulate constitutionally protected adult entertainment but the 
regulations must meet First Amendment standards.  See Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000) 
(regulation of the secondary effects of nude dancing); Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 
U.S. 425 (2002) (regulation of the secondary effects of adult bookstores and video arcades).  
 296. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). 
 297. See Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 946 (Ferber is an example of a case where “the Court 
places the interest on a set of scales and rules the way the scales tip”); Faigman, supra note 19, at 
1537 (Court balanced the value of child pornography against harm to children).  Cf. TRIBE, supra 
note 16, at § 12-18, at 939 (In Ferber “[t]he Court engaged in generalized balancing to assess the 
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In Ferber, the Court did say, with respect to child pornography, that 
“the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive 
interest, if any, at stake.”298  It also observed that child pornography 
causes harm to children and that government’s interest in protecting 
children was one “of surpassing importance” and “compelling.”299  The 
reason is that the use of real children in pornography implicates the 
“sexual exploitation and abuse of children”300 that is “harmful to the 
physiological, emotional, and mental health of the child.”301  Such 
“materials . . . are a permanent record of the children’s participation and 
the harm to the child is exacerbated by their circulation.”302 Furthermore, 
from the abused child’s perspective, it does not matter “whether or not 
the material . . . has . . . literary, artistic, political, or social value,”303 or 
otherwise does, or does not, meet the definition of obscenity.304 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, it does not necessarily follow that 
the Court upheld the statute in Ferber because the evil of child 
pornography outweighed its expressive value. This statement seems to 
have been merely part of the Court’s observation that the “balance of 
competing interests” had been “struck” in favor of regulation.305  
Instead, at least arguably, the Court seems to have based its decision on 
the lack of First Amendment value of such speech. It specifically held 
that the First Amendment does not include the visual depictions of child 
pornography that can cause harm to real children because “[t]he value of 
permitting live performances and photographic reproductions of children 
engaged in lewd sexual conduct is exceedingly modest, if not de 
minimis.” 306  Thus, the mere fact that the Court recognized that the 
government wanted to regulate such speech for the same reason that the 
First Amendment excludes it (i.e., it causes real harm to real children) 
does not mean the Court based its decision on a balancing of interests 
rather than on the fact that such speech is not the kind of speech that the 
 
constitutional value of the entire category of speech, rather than weighing the merits of the 
particular restriction on expression in an ad hoc way”). 
 298. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763-64. 
 299. Id. at 756-57. 
 300. Id. at 757. 
 301. Id. at 758. 
 302. Id. at 759. 
 303. Id. at 761 (quoting Memorandum of Assemblyman Lasher in Support of N.Y. PENAL LAW 
§ 263.15 (McKinney 1980)). 
 304. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761.(second set of ellipsis in original). 
 305. See id. at 764. 
 306. Id. at 762.  The Court noted that if “visual depictions of children performing sexual acts or 
lewdly exhibiting their genitals . . . were necessary for literary or artistic value, a person over the 
statutory age who . . . looked younger could be utilized.” Id. at 763. 
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First Amendment was designed to include. 
In any event, the Court, in creating the definitional rule, was 
cognizant of the fact that “laws directed at the dissemination of child 
pornography run the risk of suppressing protected expression by 
allowing the hand of the censor to become unduly heavy.”307  Thus, it 
held that “[t]here are . . . limits on the category of child pornography 
[that] . . . is unprotected by the First Amendment.”308 Since “the nature 
of the harm to be combated” is the sexual exploitation and abuse of real 
children, it is only “works that visually depict sexual conduct . . . [that is 
suitably limited and described] by children below a specified age”309 that 
is outside the scope of the First Amendment.  Consequently, “the 
distribution of descriptions or other depictions of sexual conduct [by 
minors], not otherwise obscene, which do not involve live performance 
or photographic or other visual reproduction of live performances, 
retains First Amendment protection.”310  This includes paintings, 
computer generated images, as well as film or videos of adults who 
appear to be minors.311 Again, the Court seems to have drawn the 
definitional line in a very speech protective way. 
11.  Defamation 
Chaplinsky also specifically mentioned libel as one of the 
categories of speech that was excluded from the First Amendment.312 
However, beginning in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,313 the Court has 
created definitional rules that have incorporated a large portion of speech 
that injures reputation into the First Amendment.  Furthermore, it has 
done so mostly based on speech values rather than on a balancing of 
interest.314  In Sullivan, the Court held that “[l]ibel can claim no 
talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations[;] [i]t must be 
measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment.”315 
Government has an obvious interest in compensating its citizens 
 
 307. Id. at 756. 
 308. Id. at 764. 
 309. Id.  
 310. Id. at 764-65. 
 311. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (striking down  government’s 
attempt to regulate such constitutionally protected speech in the Child Pornography Prevention Act 
of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2551 et. seq. (2000)). 
 312. Chaplinsky, v. New Hamshire, 315  U.S. 568,,571-72 (1942). 
 313. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 255 (1964). 
 314. But see infra  notes 328-37 (discussing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)). 
 315. Sullivan,  376 U.S. at 269. 
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whose reputations have been injured by falsehoods.316  Under common 
law defamation, the injured party may recover compensatory, presumed, 
and punitive damages without having to prove fault and without having 
to prove actual monetary loss.317  However, the Court in Sullivan held 
that the speech values at stake required a definitional “rule that prohibits 
a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood 
relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was 
made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or 
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.”318 
The Court reasoned that there was a “profound national 
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide open, and that it may well include 
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on 
government and public officials.”319  The fear of civil liability might 
inhibit free debate by causing speakers to engage in “self censorship.”320  
The Court was particularly concerned that critics of public officials not 
be “deterred” from voicing their criticism “because of doubt whether it 
can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so.”321  
Thus, even false statements, which are “inevitable in free debate . . . 
must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the 
‘breathing space’ that they ‘need . . . to survive.’”322  Therefore, “the 
constitutional guarantees require” a limitation on the cause of action in 
order to protect “the vigor and . . . the variety of public debate.”323 
Subsequently, in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, the Court extended 
the Sullivan definitional rule to include public figures as well as public 
officials.324 In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Warren explained 
that society “has a legitimate and substantial interest in the conduct of 
such persons, and freedom of the press to engage in uninhibited debate 
about their involvement in public issues and events is as crucial as it is in 
the case of ‘public officials.’”325  “‘[P]ublic figures’ like ‘public 
officials’ often play an influential role in ordering society[;] [a]nd . . . as 
a class . . . have as ready access as ‘public officials’ to mass media . . . to 
 
 316. See Nimmer, supra note 9, at 949. 
 317. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 267. 
 318. Id. 279-80. 
 319. Id. at 270. 
 320. Id. at 279. 
 321. Id. 
 322. Id. at 271-72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). 
 323. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279. 
 324. See Curtis Publ’g Co.v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
 325. Id. at 164 (Warren, C.J. concurring). 
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influence policy and to counter criticism of their views and activities.”326 
Furthermore, since public officials are not subject “to the restraints of 
the political process, . . . public opinion may be the only instrument by 
which society can attempt to influence their conduct.”327 
Dean Aleinikoff agrees that the Court in Sullivan based its decision 
on speech values rather than a comparative balancing of competing 
interests.328 However, he has asserted that the opposite was true in the 
post Sullivan cases Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.329 and Dun & Bradstreet, 
Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 330 His assertion seems correct as to  
Gertz, but incorrect as to Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. 
In Gertz, the Court held that a different definitional rule than that 
created in Sullivan was required in defamation cases involving private 
persons with respect to matters of public concern. The rule that the Court 
created for such cases was that private persons may recover 
compensatory damages without having to meet the actual malice 
standard required of public figures as long as recovery is not based on 
liability without fault.331 However, such plaintiffs must prove actual 
malice to recover presumed and punitive damages.332 
In drawing this definitional line the Court observed that the First 
Amendment value at issue was not the speech itself.  False statements of 
fact made intentionally or negligently have little First Amendment value 
and are “not worthy of constitutional protection.”333  Instead, the speech 
value at issue was the “need to avoid self-censorship by the news 
media”334 and “to assure the freedoms of speech and press that 
‘breathing space’ essential to their fruitful exercise.”335  However, the 
Court did not base its decision, that the actual malice standard applicable 
to public officials and public figures did not apply to private parties, on 
the ground that the speech values at issue are different depending on the 
status of the plaintiff.  Rather, it reached this decision based on a 
recognition of the strong “legitimate state interest in compensating 
private individuals for injury to reputation,” as compared to the state’s 
 
 326. Id. 
 327. Id. 
 328. See Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 1001. 
 329. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); see Aleinikoff, supra  note 11, at 1003 
n.327. 
 330. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985); see Aleinikoff, 
supra  note 11, at 947 n. 21. 
 331. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347-48. 
 332. Id. at 349-50. 
 333. Id. at 340. 
 334. Id. at 341. 
 335. Id. at 342. 
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interest in compensating public officials and figures.336 This reasoning 
does seem to support Dean Aleinikoff’s position that the Court created 
the definitional rule based on a comparative balancing of interests.  
However, it is worth noting that the Court did draw the definitional line 
as to damages based on First Amendment values. It held that private 
parties can only recover presumed and punitive damages upon a showing 
of actual malice because they “unnecessarily exacerbate[] the danger of 
media self-censorship.”337 
However, in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., the Court did create the 
definitional rule based on speech values rather than on a balancing of 
interest. In that case, the Court held that a different definitional line than 
those created in Sullivan and Gertz was required in defamation cases 
brought by private persons involving matters of private concern.338  It 
held that, in such cases, plaintiffs may recover presumed and punitive 
damages, as well as compensatory damages, without having to prove 
actual malice.339 
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Powell’s plurality opinion did 
phrase the issue in terms of balancing. He said that to decide the case 
“we must . . . balance the State’s interest in compensating private 
individuals for injury to their reputations against the First Amendment 
interest in protecting . . . expression.”340  Nonetheless, he based his 
decision on an interpretation of the First Amendment.  He concluded that 
“[i]t is speech on ‘matters of public concern’ that is ‘at the heart of the 
First Amendment protection[;]’ . . . [i]n contrast, speech on matters of 
purely private concern is of less First Amendment concern.”341  The 
reason is that with respect to matters of private concern “there is no 
threat to the free and robust debate of public issues; there is no potential 
interference with a meaningful dialogue of ideas concerning self-
 
 336. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348.  The Court concluded that private individuals are in a different 
position than public officials and public figures.  See id. at 344. They are “more vulnerable to 
injury” because the may have less “access” to the media “to counteract false statements.”  Id.  In 
addition, public officials and public figures have assumed “the risk of closer public scrutiny . . . 
[and] “the communications media are entitled to act on the assumption that . . . [they] have 
voluntary exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehoods concerning 
them.”  Id. at 344-45.  Consequently, the Court concluded that less a demanding rule was 
appropriate because “private individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury than public officials 
and public figures; they are also more deserving of recovery.”  Id. at 345. 
 337. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350.  However, the Court also said that “punitive damages are wholly 
irrelevant to the state interest that justifies a negligence standard for private defamation actions.”  Id. 
 338. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 757-61 (plurality opinion). 
 339. Id. at 751. 
 340. Id. at 757. 
 341. Id. at 758-59. 
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government; and there is no threat of liability causing a reaction of self-
censorship by the press.”342  Thus, despite the balancing rhetoric, it 
appears that the Court struck the definitional balance between the 
competing interests based on First Amendment values, rather than on a 
process of comparative balancing. 
12.  Summary 
The Court has implicitly applied definitional balancing as a 
methodology for determining whether, and to what the extent, particular 
categories of speech are speech in the constitutional sense.  In making 
this determination, the Court has generally struck the definitional 
balance between the competing speech and government interests based 
on what it believed to be the First Amendment imperatives at stake, 
rather than by a process of comparative balancing.  The principal 
exceptions to this are the definitional line drawn in Gertz, with respect to 
private plaintiffs in cases of public concern, and perhaps in Ferber, with 
respect to child pornography, albeit the latter seems more problematical 
than the former.343 
Furthermore, the Court’s definitional rules have generally expanded 
the scope of constitutionally included speech.  The Court has excluded 
from the First Amendment speech that appropriates private property by 
broadcasting an entertainer’s entire act344 and speech that injures the 
reputation of private persons on matters of private concern.345  However, 
it has held that the First Amendment includes speech that annoys or 
offends, provided that it does not amount to an inherently inflammatory 
personal insult directed at the hearer that has a tendency to cause a 
breach of the peace;346 stirs a hostile audience to anger, invites public 
dispute, and brings about a condition of unrest, provided the speaker 
does not undertake indictment to riot;347 advocates illegal action, 
including overthrowing the United States government by force and 
violence, provided that such advocacy is not directed at imminent action 
and is not likely to succeed;348 and causes anger and resentment and is 
 
 342. Id. at 759-60 (quoting Harley-Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, 568 P.2d 1359, 
1363 (1977)). 
 343. See supra notes 328-37 and accompanying text (discussing Gertz); supra Part III.B.10. 
(discussing Ferber). 
 344. See supra Part III.B.8.c. 
 345. See supra notes 338-39 and accompanying text. 
 346. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 347. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 348. See supra Part III.B.3. 
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insulting and outrageous, and is perhaps even menacing, such as the Ku 
Klux Klan burning a cross, provided such speech does not amount to a 
true threat.349 
In addition, under the Court’s definitional rules, the First 
Amendment includes speech that is offensive, such as F . . . the draft;350 
exploits explicit sexual and excretory functions, provided that the speech 
does not lack serious literary, artistic, political value;351 and portrays 
child pornography, provided the portrayal is not obscene and does not 
use a real child.352  Also included is truthful nondeceptive commercial 
speech about a lawful product.353 
Moreover, speech that injures the reputation of, or inflicts 
emotional distress upon, public officials and public figures is speech 
within the meaning of the First Amendment, provided that the speaker 
does not act with actual malice.354 Other categories of speech that are 
deemed to be speech in the constitutional sense are speech that injures 
the reputation of a private person on matters of public concern, provided 
the speaker acts reasonably, and if not, the speaker is only liable for 
compensatory damages, unless he acts with actual malice; 355 and speech 
that invades privacy either by placing a person in a false light with 
respect to a matter of public concern, unless the speaker acts with actual 
malice,356 or discloses private facts, such as disclosing the name of rape 
victims, provided it is lawfully obtained truthful information about a 
matter of public concern, unless the government has an interest of the 
highest order.357 Finally, even if a particular category of speech is 
otherwise outside the scope of the First Amendment, government may 
not proscribe, or otherwise regulate it, unless the government does so for 
the reasons that such speech is proscribable.358 
C.  Has Definitional Balancing Caused the Court to Include Too Much 
or Too Little Speech Within the First Amendment? 
Since Chaplinsky, the Court’s definitional rules clearly have 
expanded the scope of speech that is included within the First 
 
 349. See supra Part III.B.4. 
 350. See supra Part III.B.5. 
 351. See supra notes 291-95 and accompanying text. 
 352. See supra notes 307-11 and accompanying text. 
 353. See supra Part III.B.6. 
 354. See supra notes 312-27 (reputation); Part III..B.7. (emotional distress). 
 355. See supra notes 329-32 and accompanying text. 
 356. See supra Part III.B.8.a. 
 357. See supra Part III.B.8.b. 
 358. See supra notes 142-52 and accompanying text. 
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Amendment. However, there is no shortage of commentators who are 
dissatisfied with where the Court has drawn the definitional lines.359  
Some think that the Court has not included enough speech;360 others 
think the Court has included too much speech.361  For example, 
Professor Redish, who is neutral on the “merits” of definitional 
balancing,362 has argued “that the constitutional guarantee of free speech 
ultimately serves only one true value which [he has] labeled ‘individual 
self-realization.’”363  This has led him to the conclusion, among other 
things, that obscenity should be included within the First Amendment 
because “it is not for external forces – Congress, state legislatures, or the 
Court itself – to determine what communications or forms of expression 
are of value to the individual; how an individual is to develop his 
faculties is a choice for the individual to make.” 364 
On the other hand, Professor Heyman, who criticizes definitional 
balancing on the ground that it does not provide an adequate explanation 
for which speech is included and which speech is excluded from the 
First Amendment,365 has argued that the question should be resolved 
based on a “rights-based theory of free expression.”366 His “central thesis 
is that free speech is a right that is limited by the fundamental rights of 
other individuals and the community as a whole.”367 Consequently, “the 
First Amendment permits regulation of speech where necessary to 
protect the autonomy or rights of others.”368 Thus, under his theory, the 
First Amendment would exclude invasions of privacy such as disclosing 
the name of rape victims,369 regulations of commercial speech “to 
promote the common welfare,”370 “some forms of hate speech,”371 and 
 
 359. See sources cited supra note 25. 
 360. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 16, § 12-16, at 919 (obscenity); Redish, supra note 20, at 635-
40 (same). 
 361. See, e.g., Rothchild, supra note 9, at 223-24 (“menacing” speech); Shiffrin supra note 19, 
at 1223-51 (discussing various commentators whose theories exclude commercial speech from the 
scope of the First Amendment); Sionaioh Douglas-Scott, The Hatefulness of Protected Speech: A 
Comparison of the American and European Approaches, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 305 (1999) 
(hate speech). 
 362. Redish, supra note 20, at 624 n.115. 
 363. Id. at 593. 
 364. Id. at 637. 
 365. See Heyman, supra note 20, at 669-72; Heyman, supra note 11, at 1307-13. 
 366. Heyman, supra note 11, at 1313.  See id. at 1313-69. 
 367. Id. at 1279. 
 368. Heyman, supra note 20, at 653. 
 369. See Heyman, supra note 11, at 1364-66; Heyman, supra note 20, at 685 (“[When viewed] 
from a rights-based perspective . . . privacy is no less deserving of protection than is reputation[;] 
society should be based on respect for [individual autonomy].”). 
 370. Heyman, supra note 11, at 1317 n.227 (stating that commercial speech may be regarded 
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pornography to the extent that it “unjustifiably violates the right of 
others.”372 
However, whether the Court has included too much, or too little, 
speech is not really a function of definitional balancing.  Indeed, even 
Professor Nimmer, although touting the benefits of definitional 
balancing, thought that the Court had included too little speech with 
respect to obscenity,373 but had included too much speech with respect to 
false light privacy.374 As others have noted, the methodology can be 
applied in either a speech protective or a speech restrictive manner, 
depending on who is applying it.375  Definitional balancing requires the 
Court to strike a balance between the competing interests based on the 
speech values at stake in a given context, but it does not mandate any 
particular result.  The real quarrel that commentators such as Professors 
Heyman and Redish, and for that matter Professor Nimmer, have with 
the Court’s definitional line drawing is that the Court has not adopted 
their view of First Amendment speech values.  If the Court’s view of 
such values has caused it to interpret the First Amendment too broadly, 
 
as a “nonfundamental right”). 
 371. Heyman, supra note 20, at 696.  See also id. at 689-99, 710-15; Heyman, supra note 11, at 
1375-90. 
 372. Heyman, supra note 20, at 702.  For an analysis similar to Professor Heyman’s see Note, 
supra note 20, at 1873, 1858 n.28.  
[T]he goal of the first amendment [is] the fullest development of man’s intellect and 
spirit [;] . . . ‘definitional balancing’ which would exclude from protection categories of 
expression whose social harm outweighs their value . . . is inadequate because it requires 
weighing interest of different sorts and violates autonomy of expression by restricting 
speech based on its consequences. 
Id. Cf. Shiffrin, supra note 19, at 1261, 1251-52 (asserting that “[s]peech is important, but so are the 
values of privacy, security, and reputation,” but arguing that the Court “has been right in . . . 
balanc[ing] the impact of challenged regulations on first amendment values against the seriousness 
of the evil that the state seeks to mitigate”). 
 373. Nimmer, supra note 9, at 948 n.39 (“One can agree with the method and still believe that 
the Court was wrong in drawing the definitional line in such a manner as to completely exclude the 
‘obscene’ from first amendment protection.”). 
 374. Nimmer, supra note 9, 956-67 (discussing Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967)). 
 375. See Schauer, Categories, supra note 3, at 303 (“[I]t is important to remember that there is 
no necessary correlation between the approach employed and the strength of the first amendment 
protection. Although ad hoc balancing has traditionally been associated with a puny first 
amendment and categorical rules with a powerful one, it could have been and still could be 
otherwise.”); Shaman, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 9, at 162 (“[T]here is nothing about 
the nature of either  [categorical or ad hoc] balancing that would dictate [a particular] result.”); 
SHIFFRIN, supra note 16, at 14 (different people using the same “methodology” can reach different 
results). Cf.  Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and 
Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293,308 (1992) (“The structural choice between [categorization 
and balancing] is neutral as to outcomes; how either is to be used will be driven by a substantive 
political theory external to it.”). 
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or not broadly enough, definitional balancing as such has not compelled 
the result. 
D.  Is Definitional Balancing an Absolutist Approach that is Too 
Inflexible? 
As previously noted, Professor Nimmer rejected those absolutist 
theories that would include all speech within the First Amendment on 
the ground that they were demonstrably false.376 However, definitional 
balancing is itself absolutist, but in a different way. One of definitional 
balancing’s principal attributes is that it creates rules that can be applied 
in later cases without further balancing.377  Speech that falls on one side 
of the definitional line is included within the First Amendment; speech 
that falls on the other side of the line is excluded.378  In this sense, 
definitional balancing does have some of the characteristics of absolutist 
theories.379 
Professor Schauer has argued that such absolutist theories have the 
potential to restrict too much speech.380 Taking the exact opposite view, 
Professor Heyman, at least implicitly, has argued that such theories may 
protect too much speech.381 However, neither one of their concerns is 
bourne out with respect to definitional balancing as a methodology for 
defining the First Amendment speech clause. As Part III B herein has 
demonstrated, the Court’s application of definitional balancing has 
overall expanded the scope of constitutionally included speech, not 
restricted it, and as pointed out in Part III C, if the Court has protected 
too much speech, or not enough speech, it is not so much a function of 
the method, as it is that the Court has had a different view of First 
 
 376. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. 
 377. See supra notes 48-64 and accompanying text. 
 378. See supra notes 120-358 and accompanying text. 
 379. For commentators who refer to definitional balancing in absolutist terms, see supra note 
16. 
 380. See Schauer, Categories, supra note 3, at 274-76.  Professor Schauer argues as follows: 
[One danger of] definitional-absolutist theories . . . is that the criteria of absolutism 
exerts an inward pull on the boundaries of coverage. When a problematic case arises, it 
is tempting to pull in the boundaries so that the case is now totally outside the perimeter 
of the right, thereby eliminating the problem. The danger, however, is that the 
boundaries may eventually become far narrower than the underlying theory, resulting in 
a constriction of the right no less than if the protection within the boundaries of coverage 
had been defeasible within the range. 
Id. at 276. 
 381. See supra notes 365-72 and accompanying text (describing Professor Heyman’s implicit 
view that the Court has protected too much speech); Heyman, supra note 11, at 1307-09 (referring 
to definitional balancing as a form of absolutism). 
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Amendment values than some commentators. 
In addition, Dean Aleinikoff has argued, in effect, that the fact that 
definitional balancing is somewhat absolutist makes the methodology 
too inflexible.  He supposes the case of a child pornographer who 
“argues that he produces his work with less harm to the child subjects 
[than that supposed by the Court in Ferber] and with greater First 
Amendment benefits.”382  He says that “[u]nder definitional balancing, 
such arguments are ruled out of bounds; these factors supposedly were 
considered in deriving the first rule.”383  However, he asks, “[i]f the 
pornographer . . . is correct about the harms and benefits of his work, 
why should he be burdened by the earlier rule?”384 
The problem with Dean Aleinikoff’s analysis is his assumption that 
the supposed child pornographer’s work would be excluded from the 
First Amendment.  Although definitional balancing may be absolutist in 
the application of the definitional rules that it creates, it is quite flexible 
in the creation of those rules themselves.  This is illustrated by the 
defamation cases in which the Court has drawn different definitional 
lines based on the perceived differences in the underlying facts.385  
Consequently, there is no reason to believe that the Court would not be 
willing to create a different definitional rule if it were really true that the 
nature of the harms to children were different than those articulated  in 
Ferber.386  Furthermore, the precise definitional rule with respect to 
child pornography is that it is only “works that visually depict sexual 
conduct” by real children that is considered not to be speech in the 
constitutional sense.387  As long as Dean Aleinikoff’s child pornographer 
does not use real children, his works are entitled to First Amendment 
protection.388 
 
 382. Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 979. 
 383. Id. 
 384. Id.  The fact that his hypothetical pornographer might be subject to the original rule 
indicates to Dean Aleinikoff that definitional balancing is not “a panacea[,] [and] [a]ny gain in 
certainty it provides come at the price of reduced coherence.”  Id. 
 385. See supra notes 312-42 and accompanying text.  Dean Aleinikoff recognizes that the 
Court has created different definitional rules in the defamation cases based on differences in the 
underlying facts, but for him this flexibility indicates that there is little difference between 
definitional and ad hoc balancing.  See supra note 78 and accompanying text.  Nonetheless, there 
are important differences between the two.  See supra notes 39-68, 99-119; infra Part III.E. 
 386. Cf. Schlag, supra note 16, at 574 n.9 (“Definitional balancing does not provide . . . a 
finished product: it remains subject to change if the state interest asserted prove to be novel and 
substantially less compelling or substantially more compelling than those state interest asserted in 
past balancing acts.”); Wells, supra note 75, at 243 (same, relying on Schlag). 
 387. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982). 
 388. See supra notes 307-11 and accompanying text. 
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From an entirely different perspective, Professor Shiffrin insists 
that definitional balancing “is overly absolute”389 and is too 
“inflexibl[e]”390 to the extent that there is an “absolute preference for 
rules391 . . . for everything touching [F]irst [A]mendment freedoms.”392  
He agrees that definitional balancing “has some appeal”393 and “that the 
absence of rules is costly and that the costs are of [F]irst [A]mendment 
importance.”394  Nonetheless, he maintains that “ad hoc balancing is 
[not] always wrong.395  In fact, he argues that “in some context, ad hoc 
decisionmaking can advance first amendment values more than a regime 
of rules is able to do[,]”396 and “sometimes . . . the cost [of not having 
rules] are worth absorbing.”397  Whether or not definitional balancing is 
the most appropriate methodology for resolving all First Amendment 
questions is beyond the scope of this article. However, none of the 
instances that Professor Shiffrin cites in support of his assertion involve 
the use of definitional balancing in the present context, i.e., as a 
technique for drawing definitional lines within categories of speech to 
distinguish between speech that is included within the First Amendment 
and speech that is excluded so that it may be proscribed based on its 
proscribable content.398 
E.  Are There Really any Practical Differences Between Ad Hoc and 
Definitional Balancing? 
As previously noted, definitional and ad hoc balancing involve 
different types of balancing.399 The former seeks to strike a balance 
between speech and government regulatory interests based on First 
Amendment values, whereas the latter involves  “the identification, 
valuation, and . . . head-to-head comparison”400 of the competing 
 
 389. SHIFFRIN, supra note 16, at 12. 
 390. Id. at 15. 
 391. Id. at 12. 
 392. Id. at 15. 
 393. Id. 
 394. Shiffrin, supra note 19, at 1253. 
 395. SHIFFRIN, supra note 16, at 15. 
 396. Id. 
 397. Shiffrin, supra note 19, at 1253. 
 398. See id. at 1253 nn. 258-60 and accompanying text (referring to Island Trees Free School 
Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (removal of books from public school library); Nebraska Press 
Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (prior restraint); Branzburg v. Hays, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) 
(reporter’s privilege); N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (injunction).  See also 
SHIFFRIN, supra note 16, at 15-16 (discussing Branzburg). 
 399. See supra Part III.A. 
 400. Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 945. 
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interests. Nonetheless, some commentators believe that there is little 
practical difference between the two.401  For example, Dean Aleinikoff 
argues that the fact the Court has created different definitional rules in 
the defamation cases, based on differences in the underlying facts, 
illustrates “[t]he ‘un-definitionalness’ of ‘definitional balancing.’”402  In 
his “view, it is simply a matter of taste whether one views these cases as 
illustrations of ‘definitional’ or ‘ad hoc’ balancing.”403  He also makes 
the broader assertion, although not in the context of the First 
Amendment, that the distinction between the two is “artificial[];” “[i]f    
. . . [n]ew situations [that] present new interests and different weights for 
old interest . . . are allowed to re-open the balancing process, then every 
case becomes one of ‘ad hoc’ balance, establishing a rule for that case 
only.”404 
In addition, Professor Shiffrin has argued that “the distinction 
between rules and ad hoc balancing is not a sharp one in practice”405 
because the application of definitional rules requires an ad hoc 
analysis.406 He too uses the defamation cases to illustrate his point. He 
asserts that the “rule formulated in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. . . . 
substituting fault for strict liability is in actuality the authorization for ad 
hoc balancing.”407 Such balancing is necessary, he argues, to answer 
questions such as “[w]hat does it mean to say that plaintiff must show 
fault, [and], [a]ssuming that fault is lack of reasonable care, how does 
one determine what is reasonable?”408 The answer, he says, is 
“[p]resumably, by examining the circumstances of concrete cases, by 
making a judgment, by proceeding to compare cases in the future, by 
identifying factors to be considered, by forming rules where possible in 
concrete contexts - in short by the common law process.”409  Similar ad 
hoc judgments are required, he asserts, to determine whether a particular 
plaintiff is a public figure who may not recover in a defamation action 
without showing actual malice.410 
 
 401. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 402. Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 980 n.230. 
 403. Id. 
 404. Id. at 980-81 (discussing New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (Fifth Amendment)).  
See also Molnar, supra note 17, at 1369 n. 243 (quoting Professor Aleinikoff). 
 405. SHIFFRIN, supra note 16, at 16. 
 406. See id. at 16-17. 
 407. Id. (referring to Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). For a discussion of 
Gertz, see supra notes 329-37 and accompanying text). 
 408. Id. 
 409. Id. at 16-17. 
 410. See id. at 17.  As Professor Shiffrin says, the application of definitional rules in the 
defamation cases does require ad hoc judgments concerning such issues as the standard of care and 
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Nevertheless, neither the fact that the Court has created different 
definitional rules within subcategories of defamation, nor the fact that 
the application of definitional rules requires ad hoc decision making, 
means that there are not important differences between ad hoc and 
definitional balancing. The differences are the ones that Professor 
Nimmer articulated.411 These include the fact that ad hoc balancing 
involves a case by case comparative balancing of the speech and 
government regulatory interests in the context of the specific facts at 
issue, for the purpose of determining which party should prevail in a 
given case412 whereas definitional balancing involves striking a balance 
between the category of speech at issue and the government’s interest in 
regulation, based on First Amendment values, for the purpose of creating 
rules that can be applied in later cases.413  As Professor Nimmer said, 
such rules are beneficial because they provide a degree of “certainty 
[that] minimizes speech deterrence,”414 and provide speakers with “a 
standard” to judge whether their speech is within the First 
Amendment.415  Further, they provide greater protection against 
judicial416 and legislative417 encroachment than does ad hoc balancing 
and “can insulate a judge from legally irrelevant pressures to a 
considerable degree if the judge wishes such insulation.”418 
Additionally, as Professor Nimmer emphasized, definitional rules 
have the effect of limiting ad hoc decision making by “narrow[ing] . . .  
the . . . question” presented. 419  Professor Schauer has made the same 
point.  He has noted that determining who is a public figure, for 
purposes of applying the definitional rules in defamation cases, “is by no 
means an easy task.”420 However, this “variability in what remains to be 
decided should not blind us to the extent to which issues have been 
 
whether the plaintiff is a public figure.  See supra notes 318-32 and accompanying text.  Other 
examples where the application of definitional rules requires ad hoc judgments include obscenity 
which requires ad hoc judgments concerning whether the work has artistic, political, or scientific 
value; and advocacy of illegal action which requires ad hoc judgments as whether the speaker 
advocated imminent lawless action and if so whether there was a likelihood of success.  See supra 
notes 158, 293 and accompanying text. 
 411. See generally Nimmer, supra note 9, at 939-45. 
 412. See supra notes 39-42, 78-119 and accompanying text. 
 413. See supra notes 43-47, 78-119 and accompanying text. 
 414. Nimmer, supra note 9, at 945. 
 415. See id. at 939. 
 416. See id. at 939-40. 
 417. Id. at 945. 
 418. Id. 
 419. Nimmer, supra note 9, at 952. 
 420. Schauer, Categories, supra note 3, at 301. 
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removed from consideration in the particular case.”421  He says “for 
example [a]ll of the [F]irst [A]mendment issues . . . have been 
predetermined at the rulemaking level[;] [i]t is not for the court in the 
particular case to determine whether the plaintiff has available adequate 
fora for a response, or if the particular words spoken are harmful or 
helpful to the process of public deliberation.”422  Furthermore, “even the 
factual determinations are constrained by rule, at least to the extent that 
the concepts of ‘publicness’ and ‘actual malice’ have become more 
precise through a combination of rule language and interpretive case 
law.”423  Even Professor Shiffrin concedes that although definitional 
“[r]ules . . . leave plenty of opportunity for subjective manipulation and 
for arbitrary decisionmaking,”424 “[t]hey usually provide more 
predictability than ad hoc balancing” and “can confine discretion.”425 
Consequently, there really are significant practical differences between 
ad hoc and definitional balancing. 
F.  Should the Term Definitional Balancing be Abandoned Because It Is 
Potentially Confusing? 
In his treatise, which is the successor to Professor Nimmer’s,426 
Professor Smolla has “abandoned . . . [t]he term ‘definitional 
balancing’” because it “has not caught on and . . . suffers from using the 
word balancing, which can cause confusion with the far less speech-
protective ‘ad hoc balancing’ approach.”427 Instead, he uses the term 
“heightened scrutiny” to describe the process.428 
Properly understood, the term definitional balancing is an accurate 
description of the process the Court has used to determine the extent to 
which particular categories of speech are speech in the constitutional 
sense. It has “defined” the scope of the First Amendment by striking a 
“balance” between the competing interests based on its view of the 
speech values at stake.429 Nevertheless, there is no question that the term 
 
 421. Id. 
 422. Id. 
 423. Id. 
 424. Shiffrin, supra note 19, at 1253. 
 425. SHIFFRIN, supra note 16, at 17.  Cf. Susan M. Gilles, Public Figures and Private Facts: 
Should the “Public Figure” Doctrine Be Transplanted into Privacy Law, 83 NEB. L. REV. 1204, 
1238 (2005) (“[T]he presence of rules permits a greater degree of predictability than an 
individualized, ad hoc approach where each case is treated as unique.”). 
 426. See SMOLLA, supra note 22, at ix. 
 427. Id. § 2:12, at 2-7 & n.1. 
 428. Id. at 2-7. 
 429. See supra notes 99-119 and accompanying text. 
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has caused confusion. As previously noted, many commentators view 
the process as involving a “head-to-head comparison”430 of speech 
values and government regulatory interests as in ad hoc balancing, albeit 
at a higher level of generalization.431 
However, Professor Smolla’s solution is also potentially confusing. 
The problem is that it “collapse[s] the important distinction between 
coverage and protection.”432  The term “heightened scrutiny” implies 
that the question is whether the government’s interest in regulating 
constitutionally protected speech survives the applicable level of 
scrutiny. By contrast definitional balancing seeks to answer the threshold 
question of whether the speech at issue is “speech” that is subject to any 
First Amendment scrutiny. Consequently, the proper solution to the 
confusion is not to abandon a useful and accurate term in favor of one 
that suffers from its own conceptual difficulties. Instead, the proper 
solution is to explain the difference to those who might be misled. The 
term definitional balancing should not be abandoned. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Without explicit acknowledgment, the Court has applied 
definitional balancing as a technique for drawing definitional lines 
within categories of speech, so as to distinguish between speech that is 
included within the First Amendment and speech that is excluded so that 
it may be proscribed based on its proscribable content. For the most part, 
it has done so in the way that Professor Nimmer described it. It has 
recognized, either explicitly or implicitly, that competing speech and 
government regulatory interests were at stake but it has struck the 
balance between them based on its understanding of First Amendment 
values, rather than on a comparison of the competing interests as many 
commentators assert. 
Furthermore, contrary to the view of many commentators, the Court 
has struck the balance between the competing interests in a way that has 
expanded the scope of speech included within the First Amendment, not 
restricted it. Nonetheless, many commentators are dissatisfied with 
where the Court has drawn the definitional lines in particular contexts. 
However, definitional balancing is neutral as to outcomes; if the Court 
has used definitional balancing to include too much, or too little, speech 
within the First Amendment, the methodology as such has not compelled 
 
 430. Aleinikoff, supra note 11, at 945. 
 431. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text. 
 432. Schauer, Categories, supra note 3, at 275-76. 
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the result. 
Definitional balancing is absolutist in the sense that once the 
definitional lines are drawn, speech on one side of the definitional line is 
included within the First Amendment and speech on the other side of the 
line is excluded. Both types of speech may be regulated, but regulation 
of the former must meet First Amendment standards while the regulation 
of the latter does not, provided that it is being regulated for the reasons 
that such speech is excluded from the First Amendment.  Furthermore, 
although definitional balancing may be absolutist in the application of 
the definitional rules that are created, it is quite flexible in the creation of 
the rules themselves; different underlying facts can give rise to different 
rules. 
The application of definitional rules requires ad hoc judgments but 
the creation of the rules themselves does limit the amount of ad hoc 
decision making in First Amendment litigation by narrowing the issues 
to be decided. The term definitional balancing has caused some 
confusion among commentators who view it as a comparison of 
competing interests, although at a higher level of generalization than ad 
hoc balancing. However, despite the confusion of some, definitional 
balancing is an accurate and useful term to describe the Court’s efforts to 
“define” the scope of the First Amendment by striking a “balance” 
between competing interests based on speech values. As such the term 
should be retained. 
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